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Fiscal transfer is crucial for the provision of public goods in multi level governments. 
China has established a complicated fiscal transfer system with tremendous scale. As the 
principal provider of basic public services, county-level government relies heavily on 
fiscal subsidies granted by upper levels of authorities. Through the cross-county analysis 
of Shanxi Province, this study finds that the allocation of transfer does alleviate the 
disparities of economic development and fiscal resources in Shanxi, which provides a 
necessary condition for the improvement of public services provision. Nevertheless, the 
empirical results demonstrate that the fiscal subsidies do not necessarily stimulate the 
recipient to devote more on public services, partly because of unfavorable incentives for 
social, educational and cultural development, and partly owing to the low level of 
institutionalization of the budgetary control at local levels. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
The transfer system was introduced as an essential part of China's post- 1994 fiscal 
system and it jumped to compose 43 % of local's expendable resources in 1994 (Figure 
1-1 ). The equalization of regional fiscal capacity and the promotion of public goods 
provision are the primary aims of the fiscal transfer system. And in order to achieve the 
goals, the central authority has been making effort to increase the scale of fiscal transfer 
and to improve the system of financial-capacity subsidies and special subsidies based on 
the central resource extractive capacity (Budgetary Division of the Ministry of Finance, 
2006). To strengthen resource extractive capacity of the central government is the first 
step of the 1994 fiscal reform, whereas the next step is to support the less developed areas 
and to narrow the gap of regional development through the adoption of an efficient and 
effective transfer system (Wang and Hu, 1995: 54). Such a large-scaled transfer system 
demonstrates the central authority's distributive capacity as well as macroeconomic 
control nationwide. 
However, this increasing transfer from the central government is viewed as often not 
resulting in better services at the periphery (Wong and Bird, 2008: 458). Some researches 
even reveal that the current fiscal system in China has significantly impaired the capacity 
of local governments in less developed regions to provide decent pubic goods and 
services (Liu and Tao, 2007). A large amount of researches have been done to evaluate 
fiscal transfer from different prospects and to offer various diagnoses. This research 






Figure 1-1 Share of Transfer in Sub-national Government Expenditure, 
Percent 
1989 1997 2001 2005 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ---------------------------------------- - - -- ---- ---------I-+- transfer/expenditure! 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 2006. 
The provision of public goods and services deeply affects the quality of people's lives 
and is also a major demonstration for the development of state institutions and state 
legitimacy. No matter whether the users pay for them or not, public goods should benefit 
everyone in the society. Without the government to make sure we all pay our share 
through taxation, these public goods and services would be in short supply (Tsai, 2007). 
Governments are accountable for the provision of pubic goods and this function can not 
be practiced well without an appropriate system of finance. Fiscal transfer system is a 
premise of resource distribution and incentive mechanism for public service provision in 
China. Similar with most of the other multilevel countries, federal or unitary, as the 
information is more precise and the provision is more efficient, a large portion of the 
public services is supplied at local level. Then the rationale of the assignment of the 
responsibility to provide public goods on local level is obvious. Meanwhile, large 
countries like China with uneven natural and geographical conditions and diverse degrees 
of economic development, regional disparity is inevitable. Furthermore, the unitary 
political system determines local tiers' limitation on power sharing of fiscal resource 
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extraction, especially under the post-1994 arrangement. Hence, a fiscal transfer system is 
essential to alleviate the horizontal inequality of local units' fiscal capacity, and also to 
address the vertical imbalance between levels of governments according to the gap 
between their shared revenues and needed resources to practice the basic functions. In 
perfect state, as to individual local unit an appropriate system of fiscal transfer should 
meet the requirements on both sides: provision of sufficient resources and an efficient 
incentive scheme. 
In this research I discuss China's fiscal transfer system focusing on the analysis of its 
impact on the provision of public goods and services at county level in order to answer 
two questions: First, whether the allocation of fiscal transfer equalizes county units' fiscal 
capacity; and second, whether the fiscal transfer as an incentive scheme succeeds in 
encouraging local units to facilitate the provision of public goods. 
By analyzing the counties of Shanxi Province, this study firstly concentrates on the 
reallocation of resources among county units to check whether the receivers' fiscal 
capacities are equalized, which determines whether the similar standard of basic public 
goods are accessible for residents. As for the aspect of incentive, the designs and 
instruments of fiscal transfer are supposed to achieve particular effects on the behavior of 
county receivers respectively. An analysis of the relation between fiscal grants and the 
expenditure preference of local units is proceeded to deliver a comparison between the 
conjectural situation and the empirical condition, which helps to facilitate the 
understanding of fiscal transfer's impact on the county receivers ' adjustments of the 
priority of expenditure. 
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1.2 Approach and Methods 
• The significance of county level analysis 
The core of this research is to analyze transfer's impact on public service provision. To 
justify the necessity of county level analysis, it is necessary to define the responsibility of 
public goods provision first. In this study, "public goods and services" refers narrowly to 
the provision of services in culture, education, science 1, health care, and social security, 
which are more human-capital-oriented and differentiated from governmental 
administration and economic construction. 
Lots of researches present that the variation among different counties is larger than that 
among provinces, particularly as for the issues of public goods and services (Bahl and 
Wallace, 2006). Although under a unitary regime with the centralization tradition, the 
burdens of public service provision in China are largely allocated on local levels, even 
measured by the standard of federal states. The responsibilities of providing compulsory 
education, health care and social insurance, are mainly assigned on county and township 
levels. Under the current system, the finance of township level is administrated by the 
county level, which means an examination of impact of fiscal transfer on county-level 
government's preference of expenditure is essential for understanding and evaluating 
policies concerned with public goods and services. Whether the county-level 
governments have sufficient fiscal resources and motivations in delivering these public 
services crucially determines the social welfare and basic security for citizens. 
Existed studies on the determinants and implementations of fiscal transfer at local levels 
reveal a big picture and the primary effective mechanisms. Nevertheless most of them 
target at the provincial level and leave what have occurred at the lower levels unclear. 
Under China's intergovernmental fiscal system, I explore the relationship between intra-
provincial allocation of fiscal transfers and the provision of basic public services by 
1 Usually, science is attached utmost importance to the development of productivity instead of to the 
improvement of basic welfare and human capital. In that case, expenditure on science should not be 
included in the category of public goods provision . However, as the traditional fiscal managements of 
science, education, culture and health care are combined, the data for each function is not accessible during 
the whole time range of this research. Therefore, I do not exclude science expenses for the consistency of 
the research. In addition this part in the expenditure of public goods provision at county level is relatively 
small. 
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county-level governments. Considering the greater disparity within individual province 
compared with that between provinces (Bahl and Wallace, 2006) especially taking the 
urban and rural disparities into account, I focus my study on the impact of fiscal transfer 
on public services provision at county level. 
• The Selection of Shanxi Province as a Case 
The 1994 Tax-sharing Reform (TSR) initiates a recentralization trend compared with the 
previous tax contracting period at the extractive aspect. But provincial governments still 
get great autonomy to arrange their transfer system to a large extent. According to 
China's fiscal management policy, inter-governmental relation is normally bilateral; 
meaning that each level of government has the right to distribute grants among the units 
one level down in its administrative sphere. Yet in practice, since the development level , 
social condition and the thoughts of government leaders differ from one province to 
another, the provincial tiers' arrangement of fiscal transfer and the impacts on 
equalization within region are different. In order to study the evolution of fiscal transfer 
institution below provincial level and its impact on public service provision, here I 
choose the province of Shanxi and analyze its fiscal transfer distribution and counties' 
allocation of the resource on public goods and services. 
The fiscal and economic conditions of Chinese provinces approximately can be divided 
into 3 patterns based on the geographical location, including the eastern developed area, 
the central less developed area and the western underdeveloped area. Compared with the 
eastern area, especially the coastal provinces, central provinces' economy is less 
developed and the base for self fiscal revenue is correspondingly limited. However, in the 
redistribution process of fiscal transfer, central provinces receive less support from 
central authority compared with not only the West but also eastern regions. As Zhou 
(2006) illustrates, although the central government transfers resources back to local tiers 
through fiscal transfer system, the distribution among different regions is not conducive 
to an equalized provision of public services. Central regions receive the least fiscal 
transfer per capita and face the most severe condition to sustain the basic administrative 
expenditure and to supply decent public services. 
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Shanxi is a typical province in the central area of China. In 2005 its nominal GDP was 
418 billion Yuan and per capita GDP was 12,495 Yuan, respectively ranking 16th and 17th 
in China. The fiscal capacity was 56.58 billion Yuan, ranking the 16th. And per capita 
fiscal capacity was 1,686 Yuan, ranking the 18th and the average fiscal capacity per capita 
of central area was 1,170 Yuan and the fiscal capacity per fiscal dependent of Shanxi was 
37,500 Yuan as the 22nd in China, and the average condition of central area is 31,840 per 
fiscal dependent (Li Ping, 2006: 145) The relatively limited fiscal capacity combined 
with the high density of population makes Shanxi' s provision of public goods a typical 
example in central China. Meanwhile, the economic structure of Shanxi is comparatively 
balanced. Due to the constraints of its climate and environmental conditions, Shanxi's 
agricultural contribution is not as high as the neighboring granary provinces, such as 
Shandong, Hen an and Hebei, and reflecting in the aspect of fiscal revenue, agricultural 
taxes and fees of Shanxi compose relatively low proportion in Shanxi' s self-generated 
revenue, which helps the author to control the impacts of series of agricultural fee and tax 
reforms and to focus the analysis on the impact of fiscal arrangement. Plus, 99.8% of the 
populations of Shanxi are constituted by the Han majority (2006), which could help the 
author to eliminate the influence from the ethnic minority. 
• Research Method 
Statistical analysis is adopted as the primary method to explore the relations between 
fiscal transfer and public goods and services provision. There is a description of the basic 
aspects of fiscal transfer, including its scale, composition and individual categories' 
proportions and their expected effects, referring to the fiscal theories on the objective, 
instrument and outcome of fiscal grants. The evaluation of the impacts of fiscal transfer 
concentrates on two stages: 1. the equalization effect of resource distribution; 2. the 
incentive of grants on local recipient's preference, which illustrates the process of 
China's fiscal resource distribution and its consequence on public goods provision at 
county level to answer the questions proposed step by step. 
Further, I did field study in 2 county units (district A and county B) of Shanxi in the 
autumn of 2008, interviewing local officials as well as collecting fiscal and economic 
data. District A is a developed urban unit with more fiscal resources and its commercial-
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leading economy is expected to draw more attention of the officials on the development 
of culture, education, health care and social security functions. County B represents the 
average economic and fiscal condition of most of the counties in Shanxi. The data and 
interviews are used to explain the results of statistical analysis and also to understand the 
mechanism of the fiscal transfer's effects and county level governments' preferences of 
spending. 
The time range of this study is from 1994 to 2005. I collect data from official sources, 
including statistical yearbooks: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics 
(Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao -i:OO:tt!rrn 4!~jlf!Xmit~-f4), Shanxi 
Statistical Yearbook (Shanxi Tongji Nianjian W ® ~Jtiti:f:~), Finance Yearbook of 
China (zhongguo caizheng nianjian !=f=l OOW1lf!Xi:f:~) and Statistical Yearbook of China 
(Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian !=f=l !Emiti:f:~), as well as policy documents mainly from 
the Ministry of Finance and the two interviewed county units. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The paper is structured as follows: The second chapter introduces the fiscal federalism 
literature and important concepts for understanding China's case, and particularly gives 
an elaboration on public goods, fiscal transfer and the relation between them in order to 
deliver an explanation on the rationale of fiscal transfers as well as the effects in 
implementation under different contexts, focusing on the review of China's county level 
fiscal situation. Besides, the measurements of the concepts in this empirical study will be 
specified. The third chapter is an overview of China's fiscal institution, including the 
aspects of revenue sharing, expenditure assignments and the fiscal transfer arrangement. 
Most of the national programs of transfer are relevant to the county level of Shanxi. It 
helps to understand the explanatory variables in the following analysis. In addition, the 
dependent variable, namely the expenses of county level government on public goods 
provision, is explained. Chapter four is the core part, focusing on the cross-county 
analysis of Shanxi province to evaluate the equalization and incentive effects of fiscal 
transfer and its influence on county governments with respect to providing pubic goods. 
The final chapter concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Researches on fiscal transfer basically direct in two major ways: from the normative 
perspective, neoclassical public finance and fiscal federalism theories discuss and 
develop a family of frameworks on the structure of intergovernmental grant systems. 
Whereas, considering the complexity of actual political structure and process, economic 
models are not sufficiently explanatory by themselves (Holcombe and Zardkoohi, 1981; 
Chubb, 1985). Plenty of empirical observations have been done to facilitate the 
understanding of intergovernmental fiscal relation and the effect of transfer instrument in 
practice. This part discusses the existed literatures on both theoretical and empirical sides. 
2.1 Provision of Public Goods as a Governmental Function 
• Public Goods Provision as Responsibilities of Governments 
Government is responsible for the provision of public goods. Goods whose benefits are 
shared by large groups of consumers are referred to as public goods. The costs of making 
public good available are usually financed by taxes. A public good is defined strictly as 
one exhibiting two properties. First, its consumption is non-rival, meaning that a given 
quantity of a public good can be enjoyed by more than one consumer without decreasing 
the amounts enjoyed by rival consumers. Secondly, consumption of a public good is held 
to be non-excludable, which implies that it is too costly to develop a means to exclude 
those who refuse to pay from enjoying the benefit of a given quantity of a public good 
(Hyman, 1987: 114). Therefore it can be seen that governments are likely to consider 
providing the goods that confronted with the threat of under-provision in free market. 
The analysis of public goods provision can be further developed by distinguishing 
between pure public goods and impure public goods. The issues of which level of 
jurisdiction might provide public goods must be discussed. Local public goods are public 
goods whose benefits are non-rival only for a portion of the national population within a 
certain geographical area (Hyman, 1987: 550). According to the reach of the area, to 
which a particular public good or service confers benefits, the responsibilities should be 
divided among levels of government: the nation-widely beneficial goods and services, 
such as national defense, diplomacy, international trade as well as national monetary 
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regulations, are loaded on the central authority; the items concentrating on the 
improvement of local welfare, such as regional transportation, public security, education, 
water supply and vegetation, are responsibilities of local agencies; whereas for some 
local public projects with positive spillover benefits to the neighboring communities, 
higher level should contribute resources and encourage lower-tier to take these external 
benefits into account (King, 1984: 18); and from the necessity of income redistribution, 
central government is obliged to share large responsibility on the supply of basic 
education, health care, social security and social relief. 
As explained in the introduction, "public goods and services" in this research refers 
narrowly to the supply on residents from the departments of education, health care, social 
security and other cultural and social developments. This is characterized as certain 
human capital and social development oriented (OECD, 2006). This function is allocated 
on local level of government in most multi level countries. However, upper levels, 
especially the central authority, share the responsibility to support and to encourage with 
financial resources and other policy instruments. The provision of these goods and 
services is fundamental for the social stability and income redistribution on individuals, 
besides its significance of provision as a non-market mechanism. 
Explanations on the Expenditure of Local Government 
Theoretically, three main sets of political actors have to be considered where decisions 
about boosting or cutting local spending are concerned: central government, local 
government, and the general public. Local government in unitary system is viewed as 
created and mandated by the central authority. However, any adjustment in local 
spending is not simply an involuntary response to either the command of central 
government or the social and economic changes (Newton and Karran, 1985: 67). 
Oates in 2005 summarized the theories on fiscal federalism for the emerging of a 
"Second-generation Theory" that provides new insights into the structure and working of 
federal system. He emphasized the important contributions coming from the field of 
public choice, whose central tenet is the view that "public decision-makers are utility 
maximizes with their own objective functions". Therefore public agents can be 
characterized as seeking to maximize the size of the budgets to serve as a proxy for 
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objectives such as enhancement of power and influence, large staffs, and higher salaries, 
and seeking own aggrandizement through maximizing the revenues that it extracts from 
the economy (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). The works of "Second-generation Theory" 
of fiscal decentralization account for political process and their impact on outcomes by 
contrast with the first generation theory as "economic federalism". Recent models assume 
that participants in political processes have their own objective functions that seek to 
maximize and "officials don't simply act on behalf of the welfare of their constituents" 
(Oates, 2005). 
In this investigation of the expenditure of China's county level government, the whole 
package of governmental spending can be divided into 4 categories: public goods and 
services expenses, governmental administration expenses, economic construction 
expense and a relatively significant share of unclear "other expenses". Governmental 
administration and economic construction are two main resource-competing functions to 
the provision of public goods and services. 
Governments support a large scale of civil servants and the cost for various operations. 
Governmental sustainable expenditure is a major part of the consuming expenditures 
and composes considerable share in the budget of every level of governments. It is the 
precondition of all governmental responsibilities' practice and necessary for the 
maintenance of the state machine. On the other hand, the large and expanding portion of 
expenditure allocated on governmental administration is a constraint to public goods and 
services provision since the total resource is limited. Under China's circumstances, 
county units with insufficient fiscal resources are inclined to support the governmental 
expenditures. The lack of democratic election and mobility of population limits the 
efficiency of decentralized system of multi level government in the provision of public 
goods. Apart from the absence of effective inspection from residents, the low degree of 
institutionalization determines that the control from the upper levels of authority is weak. 
Wong and Bird (2008) attribute the failure of fiscal transfer in resulting in better services 
to the staff-expanding of local government. In an extremely poor rural county they visited 
in early 2003, in spite of increased transfers from higher levels, there was no money for 
non personnel recurrent expenses in any departments from schools to agricultural stations 
essentially because the county had been adding staff at an accelerating rate. The result 
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was that more transfers ended up producing fewer rather than more services to the 
residents. 
Compared with other developing countries, Chinese government plays a more efficient 
role in promoting the economic construction (Huang, 2005). Expenses on it remain as 
the largest item of expenditure in national budget from 1978 to 2005 and a comparatively 
workable incentive mechanism stimulates levels of government investing more on 
economic constructions (Zhou, 2006). 
In the analysis of the incentive impact of transfer instruments, based on these theories and 
observations, the author tests the preferences of county government invest on these 
different functions. 
2.2 The Design and Practice of Fiscal Transfer 
• Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation 
The characterization of intergovernmental relation determines in the first place how the 
responsibilities are shared among different levels of governments and what kind of 
political mechanism is effective on revenue share and expenditure preferences. More than 
one tier of government structures exist in the majority of modem nation. According to the 
scale of power-sharing degree between the high and lower levels, these structures can be 
divided into unitary and federal system. Intergovernmental fiscal relation theories focus 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among different tiers of governments. 
The Advantage and Disadvantages of Fiscal Decentralization 
Having more than one tier of government authorities to perform the various functions that 
are entrusted to the government sectors is the fundamental characteristic of the system of 
federalism. The governmental power is shared between the federal (national) and state 
(sub-national) governments according to the constitution, which, in terms of the policy-
making aspect, refers to a public sector with two or more levels of decision-making and 
allows diverse choices. Fiscal federalism is the division of taxing and expenditure 
functions among levels of government (Hyman, 1987: 548) and focuses on the argument 
for decentralization particularly. 
1 1 
Traditional theory of fiscal decentralization centers on the issue of the optimal public 
service provision. M us grave holds that the heart of federalism lies in the proposition that 
policies of the allocation branch should be permitted to differ between states, depending 
on the preferences of the residents (Fisher, 1997: 20) That is to say decentralization can 
improve the efficiency of public service provision by allowing the provision of 
governmental services to vary from area to area in accordance with local wishes. As 
Oates ( 1972: 11-12) stated, "if all the individuals who make up a society are compelled to 
consume the same level of output when variations in consumption among different 
subsets of the population are possible, an inefficient allocation of resources is the likely 
result." 
In fact, this advantage of multi-level government is even greater than it may at first 
appear. For not only does a system of multi-level government enable service provision to 
vary in accordance with local wishes, it also means that those citizens in any area who 
find they dislike the services provided in their area can, if they feel strongly enough, 
move to another area that would suit them better. As Tiebout (1956: 422) explained, "just 
as the consumer may be visualized as walking to a private market to buy his 
goods ... spatial mobility provides the local public goods counterpart to the private 
market's shopping trip". And also important as the first advantage of efficiency, there are 
at least three other advantages, such as: 1. multi-level government may result in improved 
signaling, that is an improvement in the extent to which voters are able to convey their 
preferences to politicians; 2. It may encourage more experimentation and innovation with 
service provision (Oates, 1972: 12); 3. If the central government handled all government 
functions, there might be poor control of bureaucrats by politicians. In contrast, multi-
level government means that the politicians in each tier need to be informed only about 
the functions handled by their tier. 
In general , the more decentralized the government system is, the greater the opportunity 
for expressing the desire for various kinds of government services and for obtaining the 
means to finance those services is. However, it can be argued that decentralization 
arouses number of unfavorable factors against the views before, including the possibility 
of tax exporting on non-residents, tax competition for attracting and retaining more 
industries, excessive spending levels financed by excessive debt, the maximization of the 
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welfare of local politicians or bureaucrats instead of the electorates and et cetera (King, 
1984: 24). Diversity may be accompanied by fragmented or non-coordinated collective 
decision-making among jurisdictions. Besides, because the economies of scale cannot be 
realized, decentralized provision of public goods could result in higher cost. Thus 
Musgrave also emphasized that the objectives of the distribution and stabilization 
branches require primary responsibility at the central level (Musgrave, 1959). To deal 
with these negative consequences of decentralized regime on public goods provision is 
the primary rationale of the arrangement of fiscal transfer in federations. 
Decentralization under Unitary Regime 
Before elaborating the mechanism of fiscal transfer in detail, the differentiation between 
unitary and federation systems ought to be discussed. Under unitary regime, 
intergovernmental fiscal relation reveals an opposite logic compared to federations from 
the starting point. Central government applies uniform national taxation system to fund 
not only uniform provision of national public goods but also broadly uniform access to 
any of the public services such as education, health and hospitals, law and order that are 
the part of autonomous sub-national governments in federal systems (Petchey, Shapiro 
and Walsh, 1997: 1 09). Theoretically, centralized provision of these services in unitary 
systems is a way to ensure broadly equal access to them for residents of all regions. And 
the provision policies attached with fiscal supports are implemented by local agents. 
Nevertheless, in real political world, most multilevel states cannot fit squarely into either 
the purely centralized or purely decentralized models. After the recent marketization and 
transition waves, numbers of unitary systems become more and more decentralized to 
benefit from the efficiencies attached with federalism. Thus, there is a growing tendency 
in countries around the world to reassign the power of decisions and implementation to 
lower levels of government. Certainly, the foundations and extents of fiscal 
decentralization under unitary and federal systems are not analytically equivalent and yet 
the tradeoff between efficiency and equity under decentralized system urges the 
transitioning state to refer to the rationale and design of federal fiscal arrangement. 
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• Fiscal Transfer 
Objective, Design and Instrument 
Revenue resources for sub-central authorities can be classified in a number of ways, but 
one fundamental distinction is between grants, which are received from other 
governments, and independent sources of revenue, which are raised directly (King, 1984: 
86). Decentralized expenditures are considered to more accurately reflect local 
preferences than decisions made by the central government (Oates, 1972), and there is a 
growing tendency in countries around the world to reassign expenditure decisions and 
implementation capabilities to lower levels of governments (Ahmad, 1997: 1). 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfer finances about 60% of sub-national expenditures in 
developing countries and transition economies and about a third of such expenditure in 
member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
29% in the Nordic countries, 46% in non-Nordic Europe (Boadway and Shah, 2007: 1). 
Beyond the expenditures they finance, these transfers create incentives mechanisms that 
affect the fiscal management, efficiency and equity of public service provision as well as 
the accountability of government to citizens. 
The main expectations on intergovernmental fiscal transfer system are to alleviate the 
regional inequality and macroeconomic instability, which are undesirable consequences 
brought about by the decentralized fiscal institution and to achieve national objectives, 
with maintaining national standards of public services as the most crucial one (Ma, 1997; 
Lindaman and Thurmaier, 2002). A high proportion of regional expenditures consist of 
education, health and welfare programs, all of which are important policy instruments for 
achieving redistributive equity. To the extent that the federal government has an interest 
in equity and regards the provision of these public services as contributing to national 
equity, it might want to ensure that program design satisfies minimal national standards 
(Boadway and Shah, 2007), whereas fiscal transfer system combines diverse instruments 
serving for different objectives, which are even contradicting to one another under certain 
circumstances. To achieve an understandable analysis of China' s fiscal transfer system as 
well as its expected and real effect on public service, a reference to the design of fiscal 
transfer is indispensible. 
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There are perhaps two major policy issues in formulating a satisfactory system of grants. 
First, it is necessary to determine the purposes and objectives for which grants are to be 
given, and secondly, it is necessary to decide which type of grant is the most appropriate 
for each purpose. The principal instruments of intergovernmental transfer can be 
exhibited in figure 2-1. The first major distinction is between the specific grants and 
general grants. 
























Source: King, Fiscal Tiers: the Economics of Multi-level Government, 1984: 87. 
A specific grant is one whose proceeds must be spent on some activity stipulated by the 
grantor. Such grants are sometimes termed "selective grants", since the grantor select the 
purposes for which they may be used, and they are sometimes termed "conditional 
grants", since the grantor makes the conditions about how they may be spent. 
Specific/conditional/selective grants address the purposes concerning central 
governments importantly but less considered by the local. Appropriate matching terms 
would induce local governments to "internalize" the benefits provided to residents of 
other jurisdictions into the "local" decision calculus. Special subsidy is presumed as the 
most efficient tool to encourage local government to provide public goods with spillovers. 
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Besides, the central and provincial governments continue to exercise highly discretionary 
and ad hoc control over special grant in implementation (Shih and Zhang, 2007:14 7). 
Matching grants can correct inefficiencies from spillovers, but they don't address uneven 
or inadequate fiscal capacities across state and local governments. Local governments 
with ample resources can afford to meet matching requirements and acquire a substantial 
amount of assistance. The units with limited fiscal capacities may be unable to match 
federal funds and therefore fail to obtain as much assistance, even though their 
expenditure needs may be equal to or greater than those wealthier units (Shah, 1991 ). 
Other instruments are needed to equalize fiscal capacities in such cases. 
General grants, by contrast, are ones whose proceeds may be spent at the discretion of the 
grantees, in other words, general grants are budget support without strings attached. Such 
transfers are intended to preserve local autonomy and enhance inter-jurisdictional equity 
(Boadway and Shah, 2007: 2). These grants are sometimes termed "non-selective grant" 
or "unconditional grants". The main justification for this major type of intergovernmental 
grants is that such grants can be used to equalize fiscal capacities of different local units 
to ensure a minimum or reasonable level of public service provision with generous sums 
going to poorer jurisdictions and promote society's re-distributional goals (Oates, 1994; 
Ma, 1997). General-purpose transfer are termed block transfers when they are used to 
provide broad support in a general area of sub-national expenditures, such as education 
while allowing recipients discretion in allocating the funds among specific uses. 
Theoretically, properly structured transfer policies can support important objectives as: 
bridging fiscal gaps, benefit spillover compensation, ensuring minimum standards of 
public services, fulfilling the government's redistributive function, preserving common 
internal markets, reducing net fiscal benefits across jurisdictions and achieving 
stabilization. And the criteria of an effective transfer system include (Shah, 1995): 1. 
Revenue adequacy: the sub-national authorities should have sufficient resources, with the 
transfers, to undertake the designed responsibilities; 2. Local tax effort and expenditure 
control: ensuring sufficient tax efforts by local authorities and formulas should not 
encourage fiscal deficit; 3. Transparency and stability: the formulas should be announced 
and each locality should be able to forecast its own total revenue (including transfers) in 
16 
order to prepare its budget. Meanwhile, the formulas should be stable for at least a few 
years to allow long-term planning at the local level; 4. Equity: transfer should vary 
directly with local fiscal needs and inversely with local fiscal capacity. 
Transfer's Impact on Local Expenditure 
The consideration on the effect of fiscal grants on sub-national government expenditure is 
one ofthe dominant issues in the evaluation of fiscal transfer. Even though the normative 
economic justification of the effect of the grant instruments on local tiers' budget can 
reach a broad consensus, the effect on expenditure cannot be explained well without the 
study of the responses and behaviors of local recipients in practical implementation. 
Gamkhar and Shah (2007) summarize the conceptual and empirical literatures to explain 
the divergence between actual results and theoretical predictions. It shows that the actual 
results obtained depend on the specific design of the grant and implementation 
mechanisms; the nature of political and fiscal institutions that guide public spending 
including fiscal rules; and the nature of the political competition within and across 
jurisdictions, horizontally and vertically. 
First-generation theories of fiscal federalism follow the taxonomy of grants to predict the 
impact of grants on recipient's fiscal behavior. General-purpose non-matching grants are 
considered to have the least stimulative impact on local spending. Because these grants 
preserve local autonomy and spending flexibility, they are expected to maximize local 
welfare while stimulating less that the grant funds. Special-purpose grants limit local 
budgetary flexibility if the recipient government was spending less than the amount of the 
grant on the assisted services. The second-generation literature of fiscal federalism finds 
that the effect of intergovernmental grants depends on the structure of the sub-national 
fiscal system (the nature of tax competition, tax assignment, and types of functions 
performed by sub-national government) and that the institutional arrangements for 
implementing intergovernmental programs (the enforcement capacity of government and 
fiscal rules such as balanced-budget requirements) are important. Based on the public 
choice theory, the most important outcome observed in practice is the flypaper effect, 
illustrating the phenomenon that money remains in the sector which received the grant 
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fund in implementation. In that case, the receiver's preference will significantly influence 
the impact of fiscal transfer in implementation (Oates, 2005). 
In this synthesis, they review a mix of empirical studies of grants' impact, respectively of 
the general-purpose non-matching grants, specific-purpose non-matching grants, specific-
purpose open-ended matching grants and specific-purpose closed-ended matching grants, 
on recipient units' expenditure on Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United States and 
other countries, most of which are based on pooled cross-section and time series data and 
conclude that the actual results obtained depend on the specific design of the grant and 
the implementation mechanism. The administration of bureaucratic system and grant 
program will be reflected on the expenditure behaviors and distort the determinant 
mechanism presented by the neoclassical economic theories. 
This study understands the objectives of fiscal transfer from two directions: I. the 
equalization effect of fiscal resource distribution; 2. the extent to which the incentive 
mechanism influences local recipients' preference of expenditure on different functions. 
Existing observations on the equalization effect of fiscal transfer draw diverse 
conclusions due to the different selected cases and approaches of evaluation. Basically, 
the transfer system is criticized for not favoring the poor regions with more resources 
because of the inappropriate arrangement of transfer, such as the tax rebate positively 
determined by the recipient fiscal capacity as well as the matching requirement of a large 
portion of special transfer(Wang, 1997; Wong and Bird, 2008) . Nonetheless, the impact 
of fiscal transfer on county level of government is rarely assessed, which leaves the most 
critical condition for the access of decent public goods unclear. 
As for the aspect of the impact on local recipient's expenditure, numerous economic and 
political analyses have been done to explore the mechanism of local governmental 
spending. In summary, the investigations from various viewpoints conclude that the 
impact of fiscal transfer to facilitate the provision of public goods is extremely limited, 
since local governments are inclined to invest more on the other functions mainly owing 
to China's current political institution. The arguments can be divided into 2 types (why 2 
types? The logic of the categorization below is not obvious): I. local governments are 
pursuing the enlargement of budget and the expansion of governmental organs (Zhang 
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and Zeng, 2008; Yuan, Tao, Xu and Liu, 2008). Nevertheless, different political contexts 
will result in opposite consequences on the relation between fiscal transfer and local 
expenses. For example, in another study by Zhang and Zeng (2008), it reflects that in the 
budget of county government of Guangdong province, education significantly takes 
priority over governmental administration due to the particular incentive scheme of the 
cadre promotion system. 2. Determined by the normal assessment of local officials, 
which takes economic growth as the most important index to evaluate officials ' 
performance, and the prospective more fiscal revenue, China's local governments are 
willing to invest more on the economic construction (Zhou, 2006). Fu and Zhang (2007) 
study the expenditure of China's local government under the context of decentralization. 
It draws the conclusion that influenced by the decentralization and current political 
evaluation system, the expenditure structure of local government is severely twisted as 
"excessive investment on economic construction; under-provision of human capital 
services and public goods" (zhongjibenjianshe; qing renli ziben touzi he gonggongfuwu 
"I£*9!~, $£An ~*t)(~-fl10~~~9}"). 
Following these analytical framework and insightful examinations of the impact of fiscal 
transfer on local government expenditure, the author will analyze both the allocation of 
resources and the incentive effect of fiscal transfer on county recipient's expenditure on 
the provision of public goods. The focal point of this study is to explore the impact of the 
selected instruments---financial-capacity fiscal transfer and special subsidies, individually, 
according to their differentiated objectives in design. The introduced literatures reveal 
that they are predicted to influence local recipients ' behavior differently determined by 
the differentiated design and the interaction with the political context. The next chapter 
will deliver a holistic description of China's fiscal institution and the fiscal transfer 
arrangement. 
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Chapter 3 China's Fiscal Institution 
3.1 The Drop of "Two Ratios" and 1994 Fiscal Reform 
During the 1980s sub-national governments secured a significant degree of autonomy, as 
a result, although China retains the legal structure of a unitary form of government, it is 
considered as a decentralized federation (Shah, 1994). 1994 tax sharing reform was an 
attempt to replace the old discretion-based system with a new rule-based one and to 
rescue the vulnerable extractive capacity of central government and its macroeconomic 
control. 
The evolution of China's intergovernmental fiscal relation can be divided into 3 phases. 
Formal fiscal system of PRC could be traced to the year of 1950 when the Centralized 
Taxation & Expenditure ( "tongshou tongzhi "mt&~.ft3Z:) system was established2, under 
which all revenues were collected by the central authority and the provision of public 
services was assigned to local agents according to unified national plans. Since 1959, 
China's governmental system came into the status of "setting up separate kitchens and 
eating from separate stoves" (jenzao chifan jieduan "71-:J:±~t,&) until 19933. Since 1978, 
China has enjoyed rapid economic growth due to the replacement of state plan by market 
mechanism for economic development, which however aroused doubts and debates on its 
distributional role seemingly contrary to the country's traditional socialist regime and the 
claimed pursuit of equalitarianism in Mao's era. "Efficiency first; also gives attention to 
Equity ("Xiaolv Youxian; Jiangu Gongping"iX'Y:.$1-}t5t, ~1®10-Sf) has been the keynote 
of China's reform. Three major modifications were carried out in 1980, 1985 and 1988 
respectively in the sphere of public finance, which significantly reversed the 
intergovernmental fiscal relation into decentralized and established the contracting 
system ("baogan zhi"f!l -T1tU), under which each level had to balance their budget on 
2 At the first beginning of the establishment ofPRC, rules adopted could hardly be described as a system 
until the issuance of National Taxation Implementation Regulation ("quanguo shuizheng shishi yaoze"), the 
Decision on the Unification ofNational Fiscal and Economic Administration ("guanyu tongyi guojia 
caizheng jingji gongzuo de jueding") and a series of other policies successively in 1950 and tax 
administration management was taken as the start point of fiscal institutionalization ofPRC. 
3 This division is according to official version of the Ministry of Finance. According to some other 
researchers the 1959---1993 period should be divided into 2 stages. See Public Finance of Local 
Government, page 85---94, edited by Zhong. 
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their own after local tiers submitted fixed amount of revenue to the central. Influenced by 
this "Administrative Decentralization and Profit Sharing ("Fangquan Rangli "n!Zt:X. il;;fU) 
incentive mechanism, sub-national governments were motivated to develop local 
economy for more discretionary fiscal resources and the competition in taxation 
facilitated this process. 
However, the disadvantages manifested soon. At first, marketization and fiscal 
decentralization reform brought rapid and dramatic erosion in China's tax base and 
constrained central government capacity of resource extraction and macroeconomic 
control. The competition and autonomy lent local units incentive and possibility to 
manipulate tax base, such as converting budgetary revenue into off-budget in order to 
escape from being handed upward. Meanwhile, the contracts between central and local 
authorities were negotiated one by one and the unequal bargaining powers of different 
sub-national authorities determined the negotiated rules of sharing were not standardized 
and sometimes were unfair. Besides, under such a system whereby local authorities take 
full responsibility for their finances, the expenses were out of control from either the 
upper tiers or the residents in the community4 . Thus, the decentralization of fiscal 
institution negatively influenced the provision of public services. Along with the collapse 
of the traditional unit-supported social welfare system after the State-owned enterprises 
reform, the basic public goods and services provision confronted substantial difficulties, 
which was fundamentally a problem of finance. The dramatic drop of "two ratios" 5 
(Figure 3-1) alarmed both the China watchers and the decision-making officials (Wang 
and Hu, 1995, 1997; Wong, 1999). The central expressed the desire to raise its share in 
revenue for long. And this is consistent with the conventional view among western public 
finance experts, who hold that a high degree of fiscal centralization is desirable in 
developing countries, especially because stabilization is significant for transitional 
economies, where macroeconomic control is weak during the shift from the use of direct 
4 According to the Summary of National Financial Work ( "quanguo caizheng gongzuo zongshu "~ 00 ~jil_& 
I ft~.*:i2f) in 1994 Finance Yearbook of China, the amount of national expenses exceeded the number of 
revenue by a large extent, mainly because of the increase of local level expenses on the unnecessary 
infrastructure projects and governmental administrative expenses. 
5
"Two ratios": The ratio of government revenue to GDP and the ratio of central government revenues to 
general government revenue. 
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controls to indirect economic levers. Besides, a strong central control of fiscal and 
monetary policies is fundamental for income redistribution. 
Figure 3-1 "Two ratios", China, percent 
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Source: Finance year book of China, 2007. 
As early as 1992, tax-sharing system was experimented in six cities and three provinces: 
Chongqing, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenyang, Tianjin, Wuhan, Liaoning, Xinjiang and 
Zhejiang, with the principle of "unified leadership; management at different levels" 
("tongyi lingdao, fenji guanli "~Jt~~ff! ~' 7t~ tg :E][).This experiment practiced the new 
sharing scheme between the central and sub-national authorities, not only on the aspect of 
revenue sharing, but also on the adjustment of expenses. However the assignment of 
expenditure focused on the distinction of responsibilities and had not made out a clear 
finance supportive solution. At this point, fiscal transfer only contained special subsidies 
for natural disasters, boundary affairs and price adjustments plus fixed grants 
combination continually following the method under previous contract system (Finance 
Yearbook of China, 1993). 
The tax-sharing reform was launched nationwide at the beginning of 1994. The tax 
sharing rules between central and local were refined explicitly. Interesting is that in the 
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most important document of TSR---Decision of State Council on the Tax Sharing System 
Management (((guowuyuan guanyu shixing fenshuizhi caizheng guanli tizhi de jueding" 
00*[)%~-=f~1-J7J'-tJl1t~W~iE~~:Ef1*1t~I¥Ji~JE) (Finance Yearbook of China, 1994, 561), 
the expenses assignments became the first issue in the explanation of the contents ofTSS 
(Tax-Sharing System), implying that great attention has been paid on refining the 
arrangement of expenses ever since the beginning of the TSS. Besides more explicit rules 
applied on revenue sharing, transfer system was enriched with tax return based on Value-
added Tax and consuming tax to insure a stable and smooth transition of central-local 
fiscal relation. And the further development of fiscal transfer system will be undertaken. 
Under the new fiscal system, the rules of game are much more comprehensive, 
unambiguous and transparent, and the enforcement mechanism are more reliable. By 
redefining the choice sets of both the central and sub-national governments, the new 
institutions greatly limit the space in which they may maneuver (Wang, 1997). This 
recentralization offered necessary condition for a nationwide improvement of public 
goods provision and people ' s welfare. 
3.2 Post-1994 System and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relation 
• Share of Revenue 
TSR successfully brought China's fiscal institution out of the previous discretionary state. 
In the first stage of public finance, taxes are severally assigned to central government, 
local levels or shared by multi tiers according to fixed formula and the absolute value and 
proportion shared by the central government proliferated remarkably in the year of 1994 
(Figure 3-2). Plus the reform established a separate bureau system---the State 
Administration of Taxation, especially for central level's tax collection and practicing 
vertical management ( 'chuizhi guanli"~l[tg :EI) to avoid the manipulation of tax 
resources from local officials. 
Through these moves, the following tax-for-fee reform in 2002 and series of 
enforcements to institutionalize the management of extra-budgetary revenue, the 
extractive aspect of China' s fiscal institution became quite centralized compared with the 
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previous contracting system---central level retrieved considerable power of revenue 
collection, while local's self fiscal extractive capacity has been weakened dramatically. 
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In respect of expenses, the system is still quite decentralized as before. Generally, the 
sharing of expenditures among levels of government follows the classical fiscal 
federalism principal. Nevertheless, the financial resources collected in the first round of 
tax-sharing by local tiers are insufficient to support the duties they are loaded with 
(Figure 3-3). The problem of how to bridge the gap of local governments' fiscal capacity 
and the resources needed for administration and public services provision has to be 
addressed in the second round of governmental resource allocation. 
24 





1978 1982 1986 1990 
--o- Expenditure Share 
1994 1998 2002 2006 
---Revenue Share I 
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• Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System 
Under such an intergovernmental fiscal relation, which is a combination of centralized 
revenue and decentralized expenditure, a more systematic intergovernmental fiscal 
transfer package was introduced, apart from the replacement of the previous negotiable 
mechanism by an institutionalized tax-sharing scheme. Compared with the former system, 
the new transfer system brings into more and more categories and the scale increases year 
by year, composing 40% of local governments' overall revenue. If this second round of 
fiscal resource distribution---transfer system-- is considered, it's exhibited that fiscal 
grant plays a significant role in filling up the gap between local's expenditure need and 
limited self-generated capacity. As explained before, subsidies are payments conveying 
various objectives of the grantor. The designs and instruments selected for the 
components of fiscal transfer are correspondingly differentiated. China's 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer includes 3 major categories: tax return, financial-
capacity subsidies, and special subsidies (Table3-l ). The following analysis aims to 
explain the logic of the design and instruments adopted based on different objectives. 
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Table 3-1 Categories and the Classification of Fiscal Transfer 
Fiscal Transfer Grants 
Tax tax return out of consumption tax and value added tax 
Return 
tax return out of income tax base 
tax return out of export tax base 
Financial Fixed subsidy under previous system 
-capacity 
General transfer Grant 
Subsidy for minority regions 
Subsidy for wage increase 
subsidy for tax for fee reform 
subsidy for poor and remote regions 
subsidy for the alleviation of county and township fiscal insufficiency 
subsidy for the reduction or repeal of agricultural taxes after disasters and 
subsidy for enterprises and public institutions' budget 
subsidy for the repeal of taxes on special agricultural products and the 
reduction of agricultural tax rate 
Special Special grants (focus on supporting education, health care, social security, 
Grants agriculture etc. other spheres of public services) 
Other subsidy for national debt 
Transfers 
subsidy after settlements of accounts 
subsidy for the adjustment of revenue assignments 
transfer from provincial government to line-item cities under the state plan 
other grants transferred in revenue of loans from national debt 
balance revenue from previous year 
Source: The classification is based on the method of Ministry of Finance, see the Report 
of National Council on the Condition of Fiscal Transfer ("guowuyuan guanyu guifan 
caizheng zhuanyi zhifu de baogao "00 ~~JG~-T~!MffiW1iE!{~~)t 118<11~ a) (Finance 
Yearbook of China, 2007). 
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Tax Return ("shuishou fanhuan" {Jl45c:IS~) was introduced at the beginning of post 
1994 TSS to avoid damaging local governments' vested interests and to insure a smooth 
transition. Currently, the tax rebates are calculated out of three categories of tax, 
including VAT, consumption tax, and individual & company income tax. Tax return is 
criticized the most for hurting poor regions' share of revenue in the second round of 
fiscal resources distribution, i.e. fiscal transfer. 
The taxes from which the rebates are generated are determined by the economic 
development degree of local units, particularly in industry and commerce. Thus, the 
distribution via tax rebate is favorable to the more developed counties with large 
proportion of industrial and commercial contribution in economy. Tax return is viewed as 
an outcome of "path-dependence" that the central government has to compromise with 
the more developed and powerful local authorities under the previous system. On the 
other side, tax return could be viewed as designed for incentive, if we see the central 
government with absolute dominant authority aiming to stimulate the recipients for 
economic development and industrialization with this instrument. If we consider that this 
mission has already been practiced by the tax sharing arrangement in the first round of 
fiscal resources allocation, especially pay attention to that the largest proportion of tax 
revenue, including VAT and income taxes, which contribute to around 50o/o of central's 
tax revenue, is the shared between central and local. Although the possibility to motivate 
economic development could not be totally ruled out, the rebate fits more to the logic of 
the "lock-in effect" of the previous institution. Through more than ten years of 
evolvement from 1994, the structure of China's fiscal transfer system changed a lot. Even 
though a new rebate from the source of income tax was added since the year of 2002 and 
it still composes a major part of fiscal transfer, the portion of tax return in the transfer 
amount diminished. 
For this part, the central authority's right to change the ratio of rebates is comparatively 
limited, and it does not get a word in determining the usage and allocation of tax return at 
local level. Local tiers exercise a high degree of autonomy in implementation on this part 
of transfer. Thus, in the "Supplementary Notice of Local Governments Report to the 
Local Congress about Fiscal Budget and the Situation of Implementation" ("guanyu 
27 
difang zhengfu xiang renda baogao caizheng yujuesuan cao 'an he yusuan zhixing 
qingkuang de buchong tongzhi"~~±-tfr1JIE~}ff rtJ A*1~ 1§-m~IE~t~ {*-~~~ot~-~1T 
t~&En1~ JEJJ!~Q) issued in 2006, it is required that in the financial reports to the 
people's congress and upper levels of government, the amount and usage of tax return 
should be listed clearly in the general budget of the corresponding level of government. 
And in the 2007 Report of State Council on fiscal transfer ("guowuyuan guanyu guifan 
caizheng zhuanyi zhifu de baogao"00*~3t~~1J\!mm~IE~~ttx11B"J1~i§-), tax return 
was discussed separately and not included in the explication of intergovernmental 
transfer system. 
The Package of Financial-capacity Subsidies 
Financial-capacity Subsidies ( "cailixing zhuanyi zhifu "m~ j] tl:~f$ x 11) and Special 
Subsidies ("zhuanxiang zhuanyi zhifu "~J.Dl~*$5[ 11) are two parts according to the 
latest official discourse. Financial-capacity subsidies are for the purpose of 
compensating the fiscal insufficiency of local units with less advantaged recourse base 
and weak self-generated capacity in order to alleviate regional disparities and to facilitate 
an equalized provision of public services nationwide. Generally, financial-capacity 
subsidies do not demand grantees' matching fund and are not attached with specific 
requirement on the usage, although they are designed to support the recipient in some 
spheres as illustrated in table 3-1. The essential characteristic of the financial-capacity 
subsidies is that their amount is calculated based on the grantee's fiscal capacity. I will 
explain the design of the sub-sectors individually. All these categories are allocated at the 
county level in the end and are supposed to alleviate regional disparity. 
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Source: Li Pinged. "Zhongguo zhengfujian caizheng guanxi tujie N (The Illustration of 
China's Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations), 2006. 
Fixed subsidy under previous system ("ding'e buzhu "5E$m~~.§}]) is the main 
mechanism whereby both central and provincial governments transfer grants to poor and 
minority counties (Ahmad, 1998; Park et al. 1996). Since no matching requirements exist, 
fixed subsidy is supposed to reduce the imbalance of local unit's fiscal capacity and the 
recipients enjoy flexibility on the usage. Theoretically, fixed subsidy is general grant and 
treated as one sub-sector of financial capacity subsidies in this study6. 
General Transfer Subsidy ("yibanxing zhuanyi zhifu" -Mti#~ x 11), formerly 
named as "transfer subsidy" ("zhuanyi zhifu buzhu "#~ x 11 ~~ .§}]) and "transitional 
transfer" ("guoduqi zhuanyi zhifu buzhu "ii~lt1A#t$ X 11 ~~ .§}]), was introduced in 1995 
to redress regional imbalance by implementing an objective formula for redistribution. 
The amount of grant is calculated according to the formula: "The General Transfer 
Subsidies= (Standard Expenditure- Standard Revenue) x Coefficient of Transfer" (all 
the regions with the amount of revenue larger than the standard expenditure, are not 
receiving general transfer subsidies). 
The Standard Expenditure and Standard Revenue are calculated according to a set of 
objective factors and the Coefficient of Transfer is determined by the region's actual 
6 This sector is not clearly listed in the official discourse of the State Council, but it is listed in the 
specification of Ministry of Finance as one of the "other subsidies". And it is certain that, this 
compensation id directly under the decision of local recipients. 
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fiscal capacity, which is calculated based on the share of expenditure on basic sustainable 
administration and provision of public services in the unit's overall expenditure. The 
larger the coefficient is, the more difficulty the local government faces. The basic 
expenditure includes the administrative expenditure of government and judicial system 
and the expenses on other fiscal dependants' wages. Based on their degree of financial 
capacity difficulty (2005), all 39 provincial and semi-provincial regions ("jihua danlie 
shi "it~IJJfLJUrP) can be divided into 3 categories and are supported according to 
different coefficient of transfer: Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shanghai, Ningbo, Beijing, Dalian, 
Qingdao and Zhejiang are below the 30% line, Tianjin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Yunnan, Shandong, Heilongjiang, Fujian, Hebei and Chongqing are between 30% and 
60o/o and Jilin, Neimenggu , Hubei, Xinjiang, Shanxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Hainan, Henan, 
Anhui, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Sichuan, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Gansu, Qinghai are the regions with 
comparable weak self extractive capacity. 
The standard of this subsidy had not been changed until 2002 when central government 
began to reallocate the increment of its revenue out of the adjustment of the income 
sharing and the name of "transitional transfer" was changed into "general transfer 
subsidy" as a routine program. This sector is the largest component in finance-capacity 
subsides with the proportion of 35.3% in 2007. Since 1994, most provinces formulate and 
implement their own transfer system in accordance with the National Plan of Transitional 
Transfer Plan ("guoduqi zhuanyi zhifu banfa":li~l~J!Jj~~ x 111}~!). They target county 
level as recipient and calculate the amount of grant according to the fiscal inadequacy of 
county government, aiming to maintain basic administrative cost, ensure wage payment 
and balance the fiscal deficit (Budgetary Division of the Ministry of Finance, 1999). 
The Subsidy for Ethnic Minority Regions ("minzu diqu zhuanyi zhifu"~~~:l:-fuiR~~ 
x 11) started as a consistent sector since 2000, which was a supporting measure of fiscal 
institution for China's Western Development Program ("xibu da kaifa"® -Sit~kH15t). 
Eighty percent of the increment of VAT from minority regions is reallocated to the 
original local budget. Besides, central government particularly offers another source out 
of the increment of its share of VAT, starting from the 1 bilion subsidies to minority 
regions in the special subsidies package in 2000. The minority regions which enjoy this 
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subsidy include 5 autonomous regions, 3 provinces enjoying the finance administration 
rules for minority region and 8 autonomous prefectures in addition. 
From 1999 to 2006, Chinese government increased the wages of governmental 
administrative staff, public institution staff and other fiscal dependants, for example state-
managed teachers, for 5 times. The respective standards of wage increase for each on-job 
employee are: 120yuan (1999-07-01), 100yuan (2001-01-01), 80yuan (2001-10-01), 50 
(2003-07 -01 ), 50yuan-200yuan (2006-07 -01 ), the increments for the wage of "lixiu" 
Cj!i!;1*) people (honorable retirees) are larger than those of employee and the increases 
for the normal retiree are smaller than those of employee. These nationwide increases of 
wages by large margins brought substantial and huge financial pressure on the local 
governments, especially those with less self revenue. Central government bears the cost 
entirely or partly via Wage Adjustment Subsidy ("tiaozheng gongzi zhuanyi zhifu" iffi]~ 
I~ ~t$ 3t 11) to insure poor regions with adequate resources to support the 
implementation of national policy. In the first two adjustments, all provincial regions 
with inadequate resources were divided into 4 grades with the subsidy coefficient of 0.6, 
0.65, 0.7 and 0.75, according to the ratio of expenses on fiscal dependents and other 
public administrative expenditures to the units' expendable revenue (self-revenue plus 
revenue of transfer in minus the transfer upward). For ethnic minority regions the 
coefficient was added by 0.5, for the Northeastern industrial bases---Tianj in and Liaoning, 
and the western minority province with weak extractive capacities---Yunnan, the 
respective coefficients were 0.30, 0.40 and 0.50. Due to Tax-for-fee reform and the 
sequent abolishment of agricultural tax, wage subsidy has been expanding and become an 
essential component in the package of financial-capacity subsidies. In the adjustments in 
2001 and 2003, central government took full responsibility for the increment of all the 
provincial level regions, except Beij ing, Tianj in, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhej iang, Fuj ian and 
Guangdong, Liaoning and Shandong (Li, 2006: 77). Subsidy for wage adjustment is a 
kind of block grant, which is granted by the national government with general 
requirement on the way it is to be spent. China's wage increase subsidy is calculated 
based on the need of fiscal resource to support the wage adjustment of individual public 
31 
employees, yet there is lack of control on the allocation process from local government to 
the individuals. 
Tax-for-fee reform ("nongcun shuifei gaige" ~t1f.R.~BJz:.!J) in rural area was launched 
in the year of 2000 in Anhui province until 2006 the agriculture taxes were abolished 
entirely. Tax-for-fee reform and the abolishment of agricultural taxes are the most 
fundamental measures, aiming to tackle the big issue of China's rural, peasant and 
agricultural problems ("sannong wenti"=~ fci] ~). However they also cut off the main 
revenue base of grass-root government with agricultural-based economy and aroused the 
problem for rural government to finance the provision of decent public services to the 
low-income peasants, which eventually causes huge pressure on the rural residents. 
Central finance arranged the subsidy to make up for the deficiency of the rural regions 
("nongcun shuifei gaige zhuanyi zhifu" :;&~1f.R.~ B)z:.!J~f$ 3Z 11) in order to insure that 
the load on peasants would be substantially alleviated and a rebound would be avoided. 
The grant is particularly calculated according to the need of townships and villages 
whose expenses largely rely on the agricultural taxes or fees. The basic expenses not only 
cover the government administration, but also the basic public goods and services in rural 
area, such as compulsory education, health care and social security. 
Subsidy for the alleviation of county and township fiscal insufficiency ("huanjie 
xianxiang caizheng kunnan zhuanyi zhifu" ~j~~-!! ~ W1iE!z ~xl~l$ 3t 11) is a program 
with a incentive mechanism started in the year of 2005, hence it is also named in the 
"Reward funds for county and township levels" ("xianxiang jiangbu zijin"-£!. ~ ~1r ~ ~) 
or "three rewards and one subsidy" ("sanjiang yibu"=~-1r ). The so-called "three 
rewards": 1. The reward to the fiscal-deficient counties("caizheng kunnan xian"W1iE!z ~xi 
-£!.) 7 that increase tax revenue by their own, or the provincial and prefecture level 
government increase the subsidy to these counties, which is to say, central government 
will arrange a grant to the recipient according to its increment in self revenue or the 
transfer received from either the provincial or prefecture level of government; 2. The 
7 The identification of fiscal-deficient county is based on the gap between the county's expendable revenue 
(general budgetary revenue, net fiscal transfer received and expendable off-budgetary revenues) and the 
standard expenses for basic needs (sustainable expenditures for government administration, fiscal 
dependent and the most necessary projects) 
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reward targets the county or township, which streamlines the governmental organs and 
reduces the number of fiscal dependents; and 3. The reward is particularly for the 
counties with large amount of grain production so as to stimulate the rural areas to 
development the agricultural economy. And the "one subsidy" is a delayed reward to the 
counties that performed well in either revenue increase or governmental organs deduction 
in the previous years during 2000-2003. In 2003, there are 791 fiscal-deficient counties 
and the subsidy to them under this sector was 15 billion Yuan in 2005, and was 23.44 
billion Yuan in 2006. 
There are some other subsidies, including the subsidies for poor and remote regions 
(''jianku bianyuan diqu jintie buzhu"X~ =J5:iil:®:f:{g lR if %5 ~r .§JJ), subsidies for the 
abatements and exemptions of agricultural taxes after disasters, subsidies for enterprises 
and public institutions' budget ("nongye zaiqian jianmian ji qishiye danwei yusuan 
huazhuan buzhu"~~~X~~,&{i::$~lf!.1.fzj'~~~~lj~~r.§JJ), subsidies for the 
exemption of taxes on special agricultural products and the reduction of agricultural tax 
rate ("quxiao nongye techan shui jiangdi nongye shuilv zhuanyi zhifu buzhu"Jfl.. ~1=1 ~~t:lf 
tz:fjt ~~1f£~~fjl$~f$ x 11 ~r .§JJ), the subsidy for grain-for-green projects ("tuigeng 
huanlin zhuanyi zhifu" ill*itffftt~t$ x 11) and the protection for wild woods 
("tianranlin baohu gongcheng buzhu"~~ft1~1? If¥~r.§JJ). Most of these financial-
capacity grants are the part of the macroeconomic control of the central government, 
which generally favoring the poorer counties yet with small size and not consistent in the 
whole package. 
The component analysis reflects that financial-capacity subsidies are adjusting along with 
Chinese government's national policies. Although each type has its own emphasis and is 
calculated based on specific needs individually, how to deal with these transferred fund is 
not a concern of the upper levels of government. Financial-capacity subsidies are 
implemented by the recipient with great autonomy and flexibility and the primary 
objective is to alleviate both vertical and horizontal disparities. And it fits to the 
categories of general transfer in the theoretic framework of fiscal federalism, which aim 
at tackling the imbalances between tiers of governments and improving regional equality. 
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Special Subsidies 
In a broader sense, Specific Grant ("zhuanxiang zhuanyi zhifu" ~J9l~f$5z.:1i) is 
adopted to encourage receivers to take account of the external effects of their service or 
to enforce grantor's preferences. Special grants individually contain requirements on the 
usage and some of them are specific-matching grants, which demand the recipient's 
contribution of fund on the designed purposes according to a certain ratio. It is the 
instrument to encourage local government to provide public goods with spillovers and in 
the mean time, to enforce the central authority's control on macro economy. Principally, 
specific transfer is not distribution-oriented, that is to say, it is not toward equalizing 
redistribution in the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfer. Special grants are regular 
or mandatory in nature or discretionary or ad hoc (Shah, 2007: 4 ). China's special 
subsidies basically follow this mainstream design and transform the objectives of central 
government into practice with respect to its macroeconomic policies on specific projects. 
The central-local relation can be defined as a typical principal-agent relation. And 
China' s specific subsidies focus on the projects in the sectors of public goods and 
services, such as education, health care, social security and agricultural-supporting etc 
(Ministry of Finance, 2007). 
China's package of special subsidies started from the establishment of PRC. During the 
early period, the scale of special-purpose transfer was small, only containing around 
several billion Yuan nationwide per year. After the 1994 TSR, central government' 
implementation of national projects attached with these large amount of financial 
resources became possible and necessary. The scale of special transfer jumped 
dramatically, composing above 70o/o of the whole transfer from central to local (without 
tax rebates included). And since 1998, Chinese government adopted a proactive fiscal 
policy as a strategy to cushion China's economy from the impact of Asian Financial 
Crisis. And the funds via the channel of specific grants increase at a high speed. The 
emphasis on the special grants projects or policies was also modified gradually from the 
investment on production to people's livelihood. In 2006, the overall number of spec ial 
projects is 213, reaching an amount of 689 billion Yuan (Ministry of Finance, 2007). 
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Compared with financial-capacity subsidies, the projects in the package of specific 
subsidies are less systematic, yet special subsides clearly take the target of improvement 
of public goods and services provision at local level from the analysis of policies and the 
fund usage. Moreover, the control and management on specific transfers from the grantor 
are more necessary and stricter in the implementation compared with either tax return or 
financial-capacity grants. Normally, a subsidy is attached to specific projects, which is 
called as "tagging on" ("daimao"nx~~). Different ministries take charge of the line-
management of specific-purpose grants accordingly. Therefore, I presume that special 
subsidy will change local recipient expenditure structure toward a more public service 
focus status, i.e. the more special subsidies local government received, the larger share on 
public goods and services in its whole budgetary expenditure. 
In the department of agricultural supporting, projects are implemented to facilitate the 
development of agriculture, such as the compensation on seeds, equipments and the 
innovation on the advancement of agricultural technology and overall development of 
agriculture. The subsidy started in the year of 2002 and increased from 26.9 billion Yuan 
to 55.1 billion Yuan in 2006 which composing 12.5% of the amount of special subsidies 
this year. The special projects in the sphere of education include the tuition and textbook 
and dormitory subsidies policies. This category of subsidy became important as these 
projects' was promulgated in 2006 and carried out nationwide in 2008. The amount rose 
from 4.87 billion Yuan in 2002 with the ratio of 2% of special subsidies to 16.8 billion 
Yuan with the ratio of 3.8% in 2006. The special subsidy on health care also 
experienced a leap thanks to the introduction of new rural cooperative medical scheme 
("xinxing nongcun hezuo yiliao tixi"if~;,&~tiffF~ff 1$*) in 2006. And the amount 
changed from 1.07 billion Yuan in 2002 to 11.38 billion in 2006 with the share of 2.6o/o. 
At present, the first large share of special subsidies is taken by the projects on social 
security with specific grants of 166.68 billion Yuan in 2006, which covers 37.8% of the 
special subsidy package. 
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Source: Li Pinged. "Zhongguo zhengfujian caizheng guanxi tujie " (The Illustration of 
China's Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations), 2006. 
Summary of China's fiscal Transfer 
It displays that the amount of fiscal transfer, excluding tax rebates, has increased from 
49.7 billion Yuan in 1994 to 139.9 billion Yuan in 2007 at a high annual rate of27.7% 
(Figure 3-6). From the perspective of structure, equalized-distribution-oriented grants, 
namely financial-capacity subsidies, increase from the amount of 13.6 to 709.3 billion 
Yuan with a rate of 35.4% annually and its portion enlarged from 27.36% in 1994 to 
50.7o/o in 2007. The amount of special grants increase from 36.1 to 689.8 billion and its 
share changed from 72.64 % in 1994 to 49.3% in 2007. During the period of 1994-2007, 
the total amount of financial-capacity subsidies is 2527 billion Yuan and the special 
transfer in amount is 3098 billion Yuan, which is 1.23 times of the distribution financial-
capacity grants. 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 
o financial-capac~y 13.6 19.1 15.9 19.3 20.9 38.2 67.0 121.5 158.0 186.4 260.5 381.4 
g specific subsidies 36.1 37.5 48.9 51 .6 88.9 136.0 164.8 223.7 243.5 242.5 342.3 351 .7 441 .2 689.8 
• total transfer 49.7 56.6 64.8 70.9 109.8 174.2 231 .8 345.2 401 .5 428.9 602.8 733.1 957.1 1399 
Source: Ministry of Finance, http://www.mof.gov.cn/yusuansi/. 
In this research, financial-capacity grants and special grants with different objectives are 
analyzed respectively from the perspective of equalization effect on resource distribution 
and the incentive impact on local ' s investment on public goods and services. 
3.3 The Finance of Public Goods Provision 
The budget of a government usually reflects its functions and responsibilities the most 
directly. Since the evolution of public finance started in 1994, a new financial system has 
emerged to practice this function. China' s 1994 TSR is also a transitional process of the 
finance institution, which aims at changing the functions and responsibilities of Chinese 
government in order to fit the market-oriented efficient development. 
The provision of public goods and services is an essential element of governmental 
performances. Chinese government spending can be classified into 5 categories, among 
which the expenses on social , cultural , and educational development draws the focus of 
this study (Table3-2). The arrangement of fiscal grants would affect the recipient ' s 
priority of expenditure. I take the category of social , cultural and educational 
development, which covers the expenses on culture, education, science, health, social 
relief and social security in local budget as the dependent variable in th is research. 
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Although in some theories and researches, governmental administration and the 
economic construction are also sub-sectors of the provisions of services to the citizens, 
this paper does not include them in the dependent variable of public goods provision. In 
this study, the denotation of "public goods and services" refers narrowly to those 
provided at the departments of culture, education, science, health care, social security, 
which are more human capital-oriented for two reasons: 1 .The author assumes a 
government is self-interested actor and its administrative expenses represent the logic of 
the maximization of the interest of bureaucrats; 2. Admittedly the economic construction 
brings about tremendous achievement of better infrastructure and rapid development of 
the economy; overall the economic construction expenses are competitive investments of 
each local level of government for further profit on revenue and are driven by the GDP-
oriented evaluation of CCP's cadre management. 
In order to analyze the impact of fiscal transfer on the provision of public goods and 
services, different sectors of government functions and the fiscal system to support them 
deserves explanation. As table 3-2 exhibits, Chinese governmental functions of 
expenditures are officially classified into 5 categories, including the economic 
construction, social, cultural, and educational development, government administration, 
national defense and other expenses. The spending focus of China's authority has been 
altered, and the pattern of the structure (Figure 3-7) has been evolved since the reform 









Table 3-2 Government Expenditure by Functions 
Explanation 
This is the largest category according to the Chinese classification of 
government spending. It includes all capital expenditure (capital 
construction, innovation funds and science and technology promotion 
Funds) and from current expenditure: economic services (geological 
prospecting, agriculture, operating expenses of industry, Commerce, and 
Transport, and Working Capital for State Enterprises), Urban Maintenance 
and Construction, Support for Developing Areas, and Policy Subsidies. 
These are current expenditure items including culture, education, science 
and public health" ("wenjiao kexue weisheng zhichu")(~lt~ .TI1:5[ ili) 
and "expenditure for social security" ("shehui baozhang zhichu":f±~1~~! 
5[ ili) covering the outlays for social relief, social security subsidies, and 
pension for retired employees, etc. 
Government Government administration, police and courts, armed police, tax 
Administration administration, and foreign affairs. 
National 
De fen se 
National defense spending 
Others This category includes external assistance, interest on national debt etc. 
Source: The Statistical Year Book of China, 2007. 
Figure 3-7 Structure of Expenditure by Function 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
• social, cultural and educational development 
~ administrative expenses 
• other expenditure 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
0 economic construction 
D national defence 
2002 2004 
Source: Ministry of Finance. http://www .stats.gov .cn/tj sj/ndsj/2007 /indexch.htm. 
2006 
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The share of the largest category of economic construction expense decreased from 64% 
in 1978 to 41% in 1994 because of the transition of public sector in China' s economy, 
and the most recent data available is 26.56 % in 2006, for the first time exceeded by the 
public goods and services expenses. This reflects that China's budget is changing from a 
finance instrument for planning economy with a large share of competitive investment on 
economy construction into a typical public finance focusing on both redistribution and 
macroeconomic regulation and control. Whereas, it should be noticed that th is just 
considers the ratio of economic investment in budgetary expenditure; as for the off-
budgetary funds, a relatively larger share of resources is invested on economic 
constructions (Zhang Jun, Gao Yuan, Fu Yong and Zhang Hong, 2007). Comparing with 
international standards, China's government spending allocated to investment is still 
quite high (OECD, 2006). 
Figure 3-8 Government Capital Spending in GDP and Total Expenditure, 2002 
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Source: OECD Annual National Accounts database and National Bureau of Statistics: of China. 
Source: OECD, Challenges for China 's Public Spending: Toward Greater Effe ctiveness 
and Equity 2006. 
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It is obvious that the expenditure on government administration has been continuously 
on rise. It grows from a quite low ratio of 4. 71 % in 1978 to 14.63 % in 1994, and to 
18.58 % in 2006. Even during the difficult period of public finance before 1994, during 
which the ratio of fiscal revenue to GDP dropped dramatically, it showed no sign of any 
deduction. Referring to the data of 2002, its ratio to GDP is below the OECD average, 
but is higher as a share of total expenditure than in most OECD countries (OECD, 2006). 
One reason is that China' s governmental system practices 5 times of salary increases 
from 1999-2006; the other direct factor boosting the expenses on administration is the 
expanding of government system and the existence of inefficient organs. 
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Source: OECD, Challenges for China's Public Spending: Toward Greater Effectiveness 
and Equity 2006. 
• The Expenses on Public Goods and Services 
The amount of China' s government expenditure on public goods and services had been 
increased during the early period since 1978 (Figure 3-7). Although the drop of twos 
ratios of China's public finance eroded the fiscal capacity of the government, in the 
budgetary expenditure structure, the ratio of expense on social , cultural and educational 
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development considerably increased from 13.1% in 1978 to 25.38% in 1993. It is a 
relatively large share of on-budget spending, and exceeded the spending on economic 
construction for the first time in the year of 2006. However, during the post-1994 period, 
its share in the overall expenditure shows little changes and hasn ' t been in excess of 27% 
yet. Meanwhile, the share of expenditure on this category remains low in the total budget. 
In contrast with other countries' situation and evaluated in light of the international 
standard, China's public spending on social , cultural and educational development is not 
sufficient. Social, cultural and educational spending can be divided into 2 major 
categories in the budget of Chinese government on "expenditures by item" , which are the 
"expenditure on culture, education, science and public health" and "expenditure for social 
security" . Figure 3-10 shows the comparison between OECD countries' and China's 
ratios of expenditure on culture, education, public health and science to GDP and to total 
expenditure in 2002. The comparison of the ratios reflects that China's spending on these 
public services is at a low level and the problem is confirmed in the comparison of the 
ratios of social security outlays. 
Figure 3-10 Ratio of Expenditure on Culture, Education, Public Health, and Science 
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Source: OECD, Challenges for China 's Public Spending: Toward Greater Effectiveness 
and Equity 2006. 
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The largest sub-sector of public goods expense in China's on-budget expenditure is the 
spending on education. OECD proceeds a comparison of the ratio of total private and 
public spending on education of 32 selected counties in figure 3-11 in 200 I. China' s 
ratios of 4.3% is among the lowest, just ahead of India, and lower than the ratio in several 
other Asian developing countries with a similar or younger age structure of the 
population, notably Thailand and the Philippines. As is known, China's National 
Compulsory Education Program was promulgated in 1995 to insure the 9-year 
compulsory education. Consequently, a decent share of the fiscal resources should cover 
the construction and maintenance of schools, equipments and salaries of teachers in both 
rural and urban areas. Chinese authorities have long recognized the significance of 
financial support for the development of basic education. As early as in 1993, it had set 
up the target that 4o/o of GNP should be invested on education by the end of the 20th 
century. However, this median-term goal has not been reached and the deadline is 
postponed to 2010. 4% is the base line of international degree of education spending, 
which is originally adopted by China to approach the average ratio in developing 
countries ( 4.1 o/o of GDP in 1991 ). Currently, the world average ratio of education 
spending to GDP is 7o/o. Meanwhile, the private sector accounts for a relatively high 
portion of the resources spent on education in China compared to that of other countries, 
which suggests that the investment and quality of personal education are largely 
determined by the income situation of individual. 
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Source: OECD, Challenges for China 's Public Spending: Toward Greater Effectiveness 
and Equity 2006. 
The ratio of health care spending to China's GDP in 2003 is 5.4%, which is only 
slightly lower than the average of OECD countries. But similar to education spending, 
share of private financing is higher than most of OECD members. Therefore, per capita 
spending on health care differentiates greatly between poorer interior provinces or rural 
areas and coastal provinces and cities (OECD, 2006). 
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Figure 3-12 Budgetary Expenditure on Cultural, Educational & Social Development 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
• Culture, Education, Science and Public Health 
o Expenditure for Social Security 
Source: The Statistical Year Book of China, 2007. 
The other sub-sector of the function of cultural , educational and social development---the 
expenditure for social security, is a separately listed item in the budgetary expenditure 
of Chinese government (Figure 3-12). This item grew at the a rate of 30% annually 
during 1998---2006 from a quite low start point, and makes up the 1 Oo/o of the total 
government expenditure and 2.06% of the GDP in 2006. This category is expected to 
grow continually to meet the objective of establishing minimum living standards and the 
development of such an integrated and comprehensive system demands priority on this 
sector in governmental budget. 
3.4 Fiscal Institution below Province 
Local levels of government take the major responsibility on the management and finance 
of public goods and services provision (table 3-3). As introduced before, the items of 
culture, education, science and public health are administrated by local governments and 
the social security funds are also managed by local governments. 
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Table 3-3 Expenditure on Culture, Education, Science and Health Care 
Local Expenditure 
National Share of year 
Expenditure Absolute Share of Proportion Growth rate Local Fiscal 
value GDP 
Revenue 
CNY Billion Percent 
1991 70.8 62.421 88.17 n/a 2.87 27.19 
1992 79.296 70.212 88.54 12.48 2.61 27.3 
1993 96.777 85.422 88.27 21.66 2.42 25.65 
1994 127.818 113.958 89.16 33.41 2.36 28.22 
1995 146.706 132.008 89.98 15.84 2.17 27.34 
1996 170.425 154.265 90.52 16.86 2.17 26.66 
1997 190.359 171.72 90.21 11.31 2.17 25.63 
1998 215.438 191.25 88.77 11.37 2.27 24.93 
1999 240.806 215.036 89.30 12.44 2.4 23 .8 
2000 302.285 245 .091 81.08 13.98 2.47 23.64 
2001 336.102 300.093 89.29 22.44 2.74 22.85 
2002 397.908 353.159 88.75 17.68 2.93 23.11 
2003 450.551 399.757 88.73 13.19 2.94 23.2 
2004 514.365 462.309 89.88 15.65 2.89 22.45 
2005 610.418 551.651 90.37 19.33 3 21.93 
2006 742.598 670.691 90.32 21.58 3.18 22.04 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China, 2007. 
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China is one of the countries with the most complicated system of governments 
(table 3-4). In the 4 levels system of sub-national system, provincial unit is at the top. 
Except national defense and foreign relations, provincial government manages all the 
governmental functions and plays a significant role in the social and economic 
management. The responsibilities of prefectures vary from region to region and basically 
are discretional responding to different provinces rules. Currently, the functions usually 
practiced by the prefecture level include urban area' s infrastructure, social security and 
the administration of the districts under jurisdiction. 
County level is the basic level of the system. Among the sub-national levels, county tier 
is the major respondent to the provision of public goods. The reallocation of subsidies 
through fiscal transfer supply significant resources for county tier to redistribute and 
provide public goods and services. The public finance of county tiers can be divided into 
the categories of government administrative expense, provision of public goods and 
services, development investment and others expenses. Almost every function of the 
government is represented and implemented in the end at county level, with the provision 
of public goods and services as an emphasis. For instance, the proportion of the expenses 
on education accounts for 40% of county fiscal expenditure on average, and the majority 
of responsibilities of rural development is mainly implemented by county tier. Theories 
suggest that the tradeoff between local fiscal autonomy and equalization ought to be 
corrected at the sub-region level where basic public services are delivered directly to 
citizens and urban-rural disparities are substantive. Thus county level analysis is the 
focus of this research . 
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Table 3-4 Structure of Chinese Government, end of 2007 
Level Unit 
I. Central Level Central Government; 
2. Province 23 provinces; 5 autonomous region;4 municipalities; 
2 Special Administrative Region 
5 line-item cities under the state plan; 
3. Prefecture 333 prefecture level regions, including 283 prefecture cities; 
4. County 2859 county level regions, including 368 cities, 856 districts and 
1635 counties; 
5. Township 40813 township regions, including 6434 street communities and 
19249 towns and 15316 townships. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 2008. 
In China expenditure responsibilities are assigned like this (Li, 2006): provincial 
governments take charge of its own level's government administration, assisting the 
remote and poor regions and the funds for technology development in economic 
construction; prefectures and counties are responsible to the expenses on their own 
levels' governmental administration, urban maintenance and construction and social 
relief and some special project expense; province, prefecture and county levels share the 
responsibilities of infrastructure, culture, education, health care and science development 
and the expenses on agriculture production, price subsidies and social security subsidies. 
The responsibilities on the function of the cultural, educational and social develop are 
divided vaguely. In that case the expense is highly attached to the county level. Moreover, 
in rural areas the development of education and basic health care are supported by the 
level of township, bringing huge pressure to these grass-roots levels under the system of 
centralized extractive power. 
Levels of local government are all receivers of fiscal transfer. What about the distribution 
of transfer downward below China's provincial level? Many scholars and critics argue 
that fiscal recentralization should be blamed for the problem of revenue inadequacy at 
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county level. In order to figure out this issue the reallocation of fiscal resource transfer 
should be discussed in advance. 
As illustrated in table 3-5, although the gap ofthe self revenue and expenditure is not 
entirely filled by the fiscal transfer received, it can tell that the centralization of tax 
sharing reform has not severely eroded the fiscal capacity of county level government. 
The ratio of the fiscal resource inadequacy after fiscal transfer is relatively small. The 
fiscal resources from subsidies compose around 40% of county tier's expenditure. 
Table 3-5 County Level Fiscal Expenditure, Revenue and Grants 
Inadequacy Grant/ Year Revenue Expense Gap Net grants 
after transfer expenditure 
CNY Billion Percent 
1993 137.2 145.8 8.6 0.2 5.76 0.1 
1994 96.7 170.3 73.6 65.1 4.99 38.2 
1995 126.1 204.2 78 .1 66.5 5.68 32.6 
1996 157.8 245.1 87.3 74.1 5.39 30.2 
1997 149.7 239.0 89.3 78.9 4.35 33 
1998 167.7 265.1 97.4 83.7 5.17 31.5 
1999 242.6 373.4 130.8 109.8 5.62 29.4 
2000 263.6 419.9 156.3 145.1 2.67 34.6 
2001 309.6 525.3 215.7 210.8 0.93 40.1 
2002 322.5 631.3 308.8 297.9 1.73 47.2 
Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics. 
Under the TSS, central government became more capable of implementing the programs 
nationwide through the retrieve of revenue share. Central government reallocates the 
fiscal resources back to local tiers through transfer which also has significant impact on 
the behavior of local agents, and can be viewed as an incentive mechanism of local ' s 
expenditure preferences. Most of the transfer categories in the national scheme (table 3-1) 
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are practiced in the county level and some of them are particularly designed to reallocate 
resources to county level governments, such as the subsidy for the alleviation of county 
and township fiscal insufficiency. The whole system has been evolving and the sub-
sectors were added up or modified from time to time. In the beginning the arrangement of 
fiscal subsidies was not fixed up and its classification was not that clear. Table 3-6 shows 
the evolution of transfer allocated to county level of government and its components 
during different time ranges. The package changed in the years of 1994, 2000, 2001 and 
2002 along with the corresponding economic, social and political strategies and policies' 
changes, which presenting the alteration of central government strategies in dealing with 
the fiscal resources allocation among levels of government as well as the changes of its 








Table 3-6 Fiscal Grants at County Level, 1994---2005 
Categories of Grants 
Fixed Subsidy (ding'e buzhu) 
Special Subsidy (zhuanxiang buzhu) 
Tax Re tu rn(shuishou fanhuan ), out of VAT and consumption tax 
Fixed Subsidy under Previous System (yuantizhi ding 'e buzhu) 
Special Subsidy (zhuanxiang buzhu) 
Other Grants 
Tax Return(shuishoufanhuan), out of VAT and consumption tax 
Fixed Subsidy under Previous System (yuantizhi ding 'e buzhu) 
Special Subsidy(zhuanxiang buzhu) 
Transfer Subsidy(zhuanyi zhifu buzhu) 
Subsidy for Wage Increase (zengjia gongzi buzhu) 
Subsidy for National Debt (zengfa guozhai buzhu) 
Subsidy for Poor and Remote Regions ljianku bianyuan diqu jintie) 
Other Grants 
2001 Tax Return(shuishou fanhuan ), out of VAT and consumption tax 
Fixed Subsidy under Previous System(yuantizhi ding 'e buzhu) 
Special Subsidy(zhuanxiang buzhu) 
2002--
2005 
Transitional Transfer (guoduqi zhuanyi zhifu) 
Subsidy for Minority Regions (minzu diqu zhuanyi zhifu) 
Subsidy for Wage Increase (zengjia gongzi buzhu) 
Subsidy for National Debt(zengfa guozhai buzhu) 
Subsidy for Poor and Remote Regions (jianku bianyuan diqu jintie) 
Transfer for Teachers of Primary and Middle School (zhongxiaoxue jiaoshi 
butie) 
Other Grants 
Tax Retum(shuishoufanhuan), out of VAT, consumption tax, and income tax 
Fixed Subsidy under Previous System(yuantizhi ding 'e buzhu) 
Special Subsidy(zhuanxiang buzhu) 
General Grants (yibanxing zhuayi zhifu) 
Subsidy for Minority Regions(minzu diqu zhuanyi zhifu) 
Subsidy for Wage Increase (zengjia gongzi buzhu) 
Subsidy for National Debt (zengfa guozhai buzhu) 
Subsidy for Tax for Fee Reform (nongcun shuifei gaige zhuanyi zhifu buzhu) 
Other Grants 
(Note: the categories in bold are highlighted for they are either new or adjusted in the 
corresponding time period. Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics. 
1993-2005. the classification is according to the method of Ministry of Finance) 
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Chapter 4 The Impact of Fiscal Transfer on Public Goods 
Provision: Cross-county Analysis of Shanxi 
• The Public Finance of Shanxi 
Shanxi Province locates at west of Taihang Mountain in the central area of China. It is 
divided into 11 prefecture-level divisions, which are composed of 119 county level units, 
including 23 urban districts, 11 county-level cities and 85 counties. The administrative 
division of Shanxi altered slightly during the period of this analysis. 
The nominal GDP of Shanxi was 474.7 billion Yuan in 2006, ranked 18th in China. 
Industries, basically heavy industries such as coal and chemical production, power 
generation and refining are the driving force of Shanxi' s economic development and the 
main source of fiscal revenue. Its agriculture is limited greatly by the climate condition 
and environment, compared with the neighboring provinces such as Hebei, Henan and 
Shandong. Thus the contribution of agriculture in fiscal revenue is limited and the overall 
revenue has not been influenced dramatically by the Tax-for-fee reform in 2002 and the 
abolishment of agricultural tax in 2006. Even so, the agricultural population constitutes 
more than 60o/o of the population. The disparity between rural and urban areas on 
economic development, governmental fiscal capacity and public goods provided are 
radical. As for the ethnic aspect, Han Chinese makes up 99.68% of the population, so that 
Shanxi is not a receiver of subsidy for minority regions. Shanxi is a typical case of the 
provinces in central China, with the disadvantageous economic foundation and tax base 
for self revenue as well as less subsidies received from the central governments compared 
with both western and eastern provinces. 
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Figure 4-1 Structure of County Government Expenses, Shanxi 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
• public services El economic construction 
ESJ qovernm ent administration D others 
Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics, 1994-2005. 
In accordance to the classification of national expenditures, I divided the expenses of 
county level into 4 categories by function: the expenditure on public goods, including the 
expenses on culture, education, science, health care and social security, the expense on 
governmental administration, the expenses on economic construction and others. Local 
governments are struggling among the objectives of "Insuring the Payment of Wages" 
("bao chifan" 1:~Wz:tffi.), "Maintaining the Administration" ("bao yunzhuan" 1:~~~), 
"Keeping the Standard of Services" ("bao fuwu" 1*n~*) and "Supporting the 
Constructions" ("bao jianshe "1*~-Bt) with a limited amount of fiscal resources. Fiscal 
transfer is expected to help the sustenance of local government on wages and current 
administrative expense and to provide recipients incentives to undertake specific 
activities or projects. 
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4.1 The Equalization Effect of Fiscal Transfer 
Figure 4-2 Self Revenue, Expenditure and Total Income of County Level, Shanxi 






1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
I o self revenue • expenditure g overall revenue! 
Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics, 1994-2005 .. 
Fiscal transfer plays a crucial role in the finance of county tier in Shanxi province; figure 
4-2 shows that a high proportion of county government's resource is supported by 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer. The ratio of self revenue to the expenditure became less 
than 50% since the year of 2001. Therefore, the reallocation of fiscal transfer 
significantly determined the fiscal capacity of county units. 
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Figure 4-3 Proportion of Transfer Categories, Shanxi 
1 00°/o 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
o financial-capac~y grant ~ special grant o tax return • others 
Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics, 1994-2005. 
The transfer categories' evolution at county level has been illustrated before; Shanxi 
almost adopts all sectors of the grants. Tax return composed more than 50% of the 
transfer at the beginning and shrank to only a proportion of less than 25o/o in 2005 for its 
limited growth rate. Before 2000, only fixed system subsidies existed in the package of 
financial-capacity subsidies and along with the other sectors' introduction (subsidy for 
wage increases, transfer subsidy and the subsidy for poor and remote regions), financial-
capacity grants has been increased dramatically since 2000 and composing more than 40 
%of the transfer. The proportion of special grants is comparatively stable around 30% in 
the package. Other discretionary grants take only small part of fiscal transfer and their 
ratios are decreasing, which implies the fiscal transfer is experiencing a process of 
institutionalization 8• 
8 The negative value of other grants is abnormal because the direction of transfer is opposite to the category 
it is listed in. For example, some counties are in the experiment of direct administration by provincial level 
("sheng zhiguan xian") other than usually managed by the prefecture tier. But for the specific category of 
grant, it is regularly listed in the broad category of transfer-in. Therefore as exhibited, the value appears in 
the record of county is negative. It is not a mistaken in the processing of fiscal data. 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
-+-GIN I GDP ~GIN I self revenue 
-+- GINC~post-transfer revenue -o- GINC~expenses on public goods 
Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics, 1995-2006. GINI Calculator: 
Wessa, P. (2009), Free Statistics Software, Office for Research Development and 
Education, version 1.1.23-r3, URL http://www.wessa.net/ 
This study adopts the GINI coefficient to measure the inequality of income distribution 
cross county. A lower GINI coefficient indicates a more equal distribution. The GINI 
coefficients of the four variables listed in figure 4-4 are computed by the calculator 
supported by Wessa.net. I input the data----GDP per capita of county unit, self revenue 
per capita of the county level, the post transfer accumulative revenue per capita and the 
expenses per capita on public goods, of Shanxi' s 118 county units into the calculator year 
by year. The results in figure 4-4 represent the extent of equality at different stages of 
distribution from 1994 to 2005. 
The allocation of fiscal transfer to the county level units from all the upper tiers follows 
the principle of equalization in Shanxi. As demonstrated in the chart, the GINI coefficient 
of county governments' self budgetary revenue per capita is slightly smaller than that of 
GDP per capita from the year of 1996 to 2004, which means the disparity of 
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governmental self revenue capacity is almost as whereas to a small extent less than that 
of the GDP per capita. The GINI index of post transfer revenue represents the adjusted 
inequality of expendable fiscal resources among county units. It is crucial for the 
evaluation of fiscal transfer that the cross-county disparity is significantly reduced by the 
reallocation of fiscal resources via transfer. Especially when paying attention to the years 
after 2002, I found that, even though the inequalities of GDP per capita and self fiscal 
revenue among counties enlarged remarkably resulted by the differentiation of the 
economic development growth rates, fiscal transfer effectively equalizes their capacities 
to support the practice of their responsibilities. The observation reflects that, the 
introduction of series of financial-capacity subsidies since 2000, including the transfer 
subsidy, subsidy for wage increase, subsidy for tax-for-fee reform, subsidy for the repeal 
of special agricultural products tax and the reduction of agricultural tax rate, subsidy for 
the alleviation of county and township fiscal insufficiency and subsidy for the reduction 
or repeal of agricultural taxes and for enterprises and public institutions (table 4-1 ), 
enlarge the portion of equalization-oriented financial-capacity transfer (figure 4-3) and 
are proved effective in implementation. 
Table 4-1 Composition of Financial-capacity Subsidies at County Level, Shanxi, CNY 
subsidy for subsidy for 
reduction or 
subsidy repeal of special subsidy for repeal of 
fixed general subsidy for tax- agricultural alleviation of agricultural Year 
subsidy transfer for wage for-fee products on & county and taxes & for 
m crease 
reform reduction of township fiscal enterprises & 
agricultural tax insufficiency public 
rate institutions 
1994 18,861 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 18,861 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 35,937 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 29,016 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 25,626 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 32,011 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 25,373 32,081 82,935 0 0 0 0 
2001 23,102 40,780 207,761 0 0 0 0 
2002 23,293 91769 263,573 29,387 0 0 0 
2003 23,203 129,933 289,181 101,772 0 0 11,054 
2004 24,220 227,243 314,789 102,033 12,744 0 8,434 
2005 23,952 403,846 314,789 115,740 48,573 42,834 0 
Source: National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics, 1995-2006. 
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Additionally, after the transfer of fiscal subsidies, the disparity among counties' spending 
on public services is more equalized. This GINI coefficient comparison reveals that the 
redistribution of fiscal transfer is remarkably equalizing county tier's fiscal capacity and 
promoting favorable circumstances for a decent provision of public goods. 
4.2 The Impact of Fiscal Transfer on County Governments' 
Preference of Expenditure 
As introduced before, China's public expenditure can be classified by function into 5 
categories. At county level, governments' expenditures are divided into 4 broad 
categories in this analysis, including the expenditure on public goods and services which 
focus on the expenditures on the function of social, cultural and educational development, 
the expenditure on economic construction and the expenses on government 
administration. Table 4-2 demonstrates how I construct the broad categories in 
accordance to the official version of classification. Here the on-budgetary expenditure of 
local government is adopted to measure the provision of pubic goods and services. Also 
the situation of the other two categories of expenditures on economic construction and 
government administration are examined. Because these three functions are competing 
the limited amount of fiscal resource, the comparison would help answer where the 
resource is attracted to. From another perspective, because these three categories show 
different logics of local governments' preferences on expenditure, it will reflect the 
mechanism of how local recipients' redistribute fiscal resources in implementation under 
the impact of fiscal transfer. 
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Items at County Level 
operating expenses for culture 
operating expenses for education 
operating expenses for science 
operating expenses for health 
social security subsidies expense 
expenditure for capital construction 
expenditure supporting rural production 
expenditure for forestry 
expenditure for meteorology and water resources 
expenditure supporting agricultural production 
innovation fund 
price subsidies 
Expenses on expenditure for government administration 
Government 
Administration expenditure for public security, procuracy and courts 
Others other expenses 
Note: the names of some concepts slightly changed during the period. The listed items of 
county level expenditures are from the data source of National Prefecture, Cities and 
County Fiscal Statistics, which are not exactly the same as what is listed in Finance 
Yearbook of China because of the specific situation of prefecture and county level 
finance. Source: National Prefecture, City and County Fiscal Statistics. 
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Framework Explanation: 
The dataset used in this part is the panel data of Shanxi' s 114 county level units in 12 
years from 1994 to 20059• The county level statistics is mainly from the National 
Prefecture, city and county fiscal statistics during the corresponding time range and some 
of the missing points are filled up referring to Shanxi Statistical Yearbooks and 
chorography of three prefectures (Taiyuan, Datong, Yangquan). 
In this analysis, I intend to know the impact of fiscal transfer on local government 
expenditure through estimating the following baseline specification: 
Where i indexes counties and t corresponds to time, respectively. The expression E 
represents the dependent variable referring to the proportion of expenditures on public 
goods and services, economic construction and governmental administration, respectively 
in different models. It accounts for the local government's preference and perceived 
importance on these functions. T represents the predictors of interest, respectively 
representing the share of fiscal transfer, the share of special transfer and the share of 
financial-capacity transfer in local recipients' total current budget in different models. X 
is a vector of economic, social and fiscal indicators including the share of the other 
category of transfer in total revenue, self revenue per capita, and the ratio of urban 
population, population and the share of corresponding expenditures in the previous year. 
2 is the time-invariant and county-specific effect for county i; and (is the county-
invariant and time-specific effect of the year t. c is the disturbance summarizing the 
effects of other sources of differences in the dependent variable. Hausman tests exhibit 
that there are systematic differences between the coefficients of random-effect and fixed-
effect models, so it is unsafe to use random-effect model 10• Here I adopt the two-way 
fixed effect model for the estimation. 
9 There were 118 county units from 1994-1998 and the urban area of Taiyuan Prefecture was reorganized 
in the year of 1998 and its sub-units altered from 5 districts to 6 districts. To keep the consistency of the 
panel data, I divide the whole urban area into 5 units equally and use the average value . 
10 Hausman test is generally accepted to choose between fixed and random effects . Statistically, fixed 
effects are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data but they may not be the most efficient model. 
Random effects will deliver better P-values as they are more efficient, so it should be chosen if statistically 
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Table 4-3 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. M in Max 
Dependent variable 
PUB_Exp share of expenditure on 1368 30.16 7.04 6.05 52.89 
public goods 
ECO_Exp share of expenditure on 1368 10.04 4.36 0 33.61 
economic construction 
GOV_Exp share of expenditure on 1368 25.54 6.08 11.93 59.50 
government admin. 
Predictor of Interest 
TRA Rev share of transfer without 1368 39.95 23.00 -34.20 95.69 
-
tax return in total revenue 
SPE Rev share of special subsidies in 1368 20.39 11.30 2.68 94.35 
total revenue 
FC Rev share of financial -capacity 1368 16.26 16.93 0.00 69.55 
-
subsidy in total revenue 
Control Variable 
TRA transfer received without 1368 241.93 289.38 -164.65 2545.62 
tax return per capita 
SPE special subsidies received 1368 107.95 105.86 4.93 1246.66 per capita 
FC financial capacity 1368 112.69 166.46 0.00 1401.66 
transfer per capita 
SELFRev local government self 1368 199.82 149.18 11.36 1299.06 
revenue per capita 
GDP GDP per capita 1362 4415.74 3657.69 113.40 35223.38 
URB ratio of urban population 1368 22.54 20.70 4.01 100.00 
POP Population (thousand) 1368 261.17 138.05 56.09 782.08 
Absolute Value of Expenditures 
Expenditure on public 
PUB_capita goods per capita 1368 143.54 102.16 9.30 583.80 
Expenditure on economic 
ECO_capita construction per capita 1368 55.78 66.04 0.00 510.29 
Expenditure on government 
GOY capita admin. 2er ca2ita 1368 116.97 78.01 24.30 696.00 
justifiable to do so. Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effect estimator. If they 
are (insignificant P-value, Prob>chi2 larger than 0.05) then it is safe to use random effects . Whereas in the 
tests in this study between random and fixed effects, the P-value is significant, so it is unsafe to adopt 
random estimators (see Data and Statistical Services, Princeton University). 
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The basic characteristics (table 4-3) shows that among the three categories of 
expenditures in the budget of county level government, the share of expenses on public 
goods and services is the largest, which averagely takes 30%, while its diversity among 
cases is also the largest. Referring to the absolute value per capita, the public goods 
provision is also the largest as well as the most diversified categories. It is interesting to 
note that if the "other" expenditure is considered, it takes an average of 34% of county 
expenses, which exhibits the high degree of flexibility in county budgeting process. 
Comparably, the governmental administration expenses account for 25% on average of 
county government's expenses and the economic construction is the third and not as 
dominant as its share in the national budget. The standard deviation of government 
administration spending share is 6.08% and that with economic construction is the 
smallest, 4.36o/o. 
Transfer package is expected to reallocate resources or encourage local governments' 
effort on specific projects. In this analysis, I exclude the impact of tax return, since it is 
almost the same as local tier's self-revenue either judged from the rules of allocation or 
the requirement on usage. So the fiscal transfer in the estimation is only composed by 
financial subsidies and special subsidies. The proportion of fiscal transfer in overall 
county budgetary revenue is astonishingly high with an average of 40% and presents high 
degree of diversity with the standard deviation of 23.0. 
On average, 20 % of local budgetary revenue is from the special subsidies. They are 
arranged to promote specific projects in the departments of education, health care, social 
security and agriculture support. So in the following analysis, special subsidy is presumed 
to result in more spending on the provision of public goods and also should have a 
contribution to the category of economic construction expenses, since agriculture 
production and rural development which is also an emphasis of special-purpose grants in 
China, compose the majority of economic construction at Shanxi 's county level. And its 
influence is controlled in the analysis of the impact on governmental administration 
expenses. 
As for the financial-capacity transfer, which is reallocated via various channels to 
compensate the local tier's inadequacy of fiscal resource and to alleviate the disparities 
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through an equalization-oriented distribution, it is less likely to stimulate locals' 
investment on public goods or economic construction than to be spent on sustaining the 
public administration on both the current expenses and government employees' salaries. 
Hence financial capacity transfer is selected as the predictor of interest in the test of the 
impact on the share of expenses on government administration. And its influence is 
controlled in the analysis of the impact on public goods expense and economic 
construction expenses. 
Meanwhile I choose other control variables relevant to local's budget. Local tiers' self 
revenue basically is tax revenue, which measures the economic development degree of 
the unit and its fiscal extractive capacity. It significantly influences local governments' 
expenditure preferences that if the self resource is more sufficient county officials are 
likely to invest on their own interest (Administrative Expenditures) or the prospective 
advantage for promotion (economic construction). By contrast, GDP per capita is a more 
classical variable to control economic development level. But here I dropped it mainly for 
the disturbing effect from the multi-linearity between GDP per capita and the fiscal 
revenue per capita. Fiscal revenue per capita turns out to be a more prominent 
explanatory variable than per capita GDP in the number of tested models. It is considered 
that in this study the fiscal situation is more directly relevant to local official's preference 
on expenses. The urbanization degree is measured by the ratio of urban population, which 
also helps to reflect the structure of population in the test. The population is examined to 
control the scale of economy. 
After checking the distributions of data 11, I adopt some variables log-transformed (natural 
log) in the model , including the share of transfer (without tax return) in total revenue, 
share of special subsidies in total revenue, share of financial-capacity transfer in total 
revenue, absolute values of the transfer per capita, special subsidies per capita, financial-
capacity subsidies per capita, the self revenue per capita, ratio of urban population and 
population to get approximate normal distributions for regression analysis. 
11 If the variable is approximately normal hypothesis tests will have better statistical properties . Hence, 
logarithmic transformation variable is generally used to pull outlying data from a positively skewed 
distribution closed to be normally distributed . 
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Table 4-4 Bivariate Correlation Coefficients 
PUB ECO GOY TRA SPE FC TRA SPE FC SELF URB POP 
- - -


























N 1355 1355 1355 1355 
SPE -.057 .320 -.157 .644 
-
Rev In * ** ** ** 
N 1368 1368 1368 1355 1368 
FC .1 04 .280 -.231 .524 .339 
-
Rev In ** ** ** ** ** 
N 996 996 996 990 996 996 
TRA -.171 .429 -.326 .808 .376 .562 
Ln ** ** ** ** ** ** 
N 1355 1355 1355 1355 1355 990 
SPE -.181 .476 -.395 .653 .644 .554 
Ln ** ** ** ** ** ** 
FC 
Ln 
N 1368 1368 
-0.009 ·368 
** 
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N 1368 1368 1368 1355 1368 996 1355 1368 996 1368 1368 
POP .293 -.332 -.234 -.391 -.408 -.186 -.407 -.4 74 -.215 .092 .1 15 
In ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
In 
N 1368 1368 1368 1355 1368 996 1355 1368 996 1368 1368 1368 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
* *. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Note: N is standing for number of observations. 
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The crosstab of bivariate correlation coefficients illustrates the basic relations between 
variables in the regression test. From the perspective of the impact of fiscal transfer, it 
shows that the presumed positive relation between special transfer and public goods 
provision doesn't exist in the bivariate correlation test. The share of special transfer in 
budgetary revenue is negatively correlated to the proportion of expenditures on public 
goods and services. However it is strongly confirmed that special subsidy is promoting 
county government's effort on economic construction by a highly significant positive 
correlation. As for the impact of financial-capacity subsidy, its presumed positive 
correlation with the expenditure on governmental administration is also turned down in 
this primary test. Fiscal transfer is most favorable to economic construction. From the 
perspective of expenditure, public goods and governmental administration are both at the 
disadvantaged position in contrast with economic development. Only the share of 
economic construction is highly significantly positive-correlated with fiscal transfer and 
both of its sub-sectors. 
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Table 4-5 Impact of Fiscal Transfer on the Share of Public Goods Expenditure 
Share of expenditure on Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
public goods (0/o) 
Predictor of Interest 
Share of special subsidies (ln) 
-2.444*** 
(0.44) 
Special subsidies per capita (In) 
-1.874*** 
(0.34) 
Share of transfer (ln) 0.346 
(0.28) 
Transfer received per capita (ln) 0.401 ** 
(0.169) 
Control Variables 
Share of financial-capacity 0.982 *** 
transfer (ln) (0.18) 
Financial capacity transfer per 1.227*** 
capita (ln) (0.18) 
Local government self revenue -2.337*** -1.763*** -1.703*** -2.060*** 
per capita (ln) (0.32) (0.36) (0.32) (0.356) 
Ratio of urban population (ln) 4.942*** 5.124*** 5.850*** 5.567*** 
(0.59) (0.60) (0.55) (0.567) 
Population (ln) 3.791 *** 4.069 12.476*** 11.486*** 
(2.67) (2.72) (2.29) (2.334) 
Lagged Share of expenditure on 0.417 *** 0.414*** 0.484*** 0.481 *** 
public goods(%) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0 19) 
Constant -0.543*** -6.702 -62.241 *** -54.952*** 
(14.16) (14.59) (12.03) (12.535) 
R-Square 0.3828 0.3773 0.2252 0.2417 
Number of observations 944 944 1241 1241 
Groups 114 114 114 114 
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significant codes: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<O.Ol. 
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Through the test, it is exhibited that the effect of fiscal transfer on public services 
investment is positive after the recipient's economic and fiscal conditions and the omitted 
factors from the group and time are controlled. Either the increment of absolute 
investment or that of the proportion in the recipient's total revenue will increase county 
government preference to spend more on public goods and services. One unit increase of 
the logged percent of fiscal transfer in revenue will contribute to 0.346% more share of 
the expenses on public goods in local governments' current budgetary expenditure. And 1 
unit increase of the logged absolute value of fiscal transfer per capita will contribute to 
0.401 o/o more share ofthe expenses on public goods in local government's total 
expenditure at the significant level of 0.0 1. 
Contrary to the prediction, the significant predictor-special transfer is not efficient to 
stimulate local government to spend more on public services. The regression coefficients 
are negative at the significant level of 0.01, which is contradicted to the situation 
hypothesized that they are arranged to promote specific projects in the fields of education, 
culture, health care and social security. It suggests that in Shanxi, the allocation and 
management of special subsidies fail to encourage county tier investing more on the 
public services, which is a deviation from the original objective and design of special 
subsidies introduced before. 
The positive sign of the financial-capacity subsidy's effect suggests that fiscal resources 
for the compensation of county government's fiscal capacity allow the recipient to spend 
more on public goods and services. Such a positive correlation between the financial-
capacity transfer and the expenditure on public goods is mainly because the employees of 
public institutions ("shiye danwei" $~lf!.1il) account for more than half of the fiscal 
dependents, which share the wage increases subsidies with civil servants according to the 
same standards. In National Prefecture and County Fiscal Statistics the fiscal dependents 
are categorized into the employees of public institutions ("shiye danwei renyuan" $= ~lf!. 
1ft A. JJJ.) and civi I servants ("xingzheng renyuan"1T I£!£ A. fJJ.) in the years of 1995 and 
1996 only. In 1995, the number of fiscal dependents of county level units of Shanxi 
province is 825,714 among which 610,620 are employees of public institutions. In 1996, 
the amount of fiscal dependents is 850,662 with 606,096 are employed by public 
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institutions. According to the Temporary Rules of Registration Management of Public 
Institutions ("shiiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli "$ ~lf!. 1.fl~i2/g l-'.~1T ~'WU), 
public institutions in China refer to the public sectors sponsored by state organs or other 
organization with the resource of state owned assets and working on the social benefits at 
the social service departments of education, science, culture and health care (State 
Council , 2004). Meanwhile, the spending on the salaries of the employees, such as 
teachers and researchers is the main expense on the corresponding departments, 
especially in the poor regions. For instance, the expense on education, which is the 
largest item in the public good expenses at county level, is composed mainly by the 
salaries of state-managed teachers ("gongban jiaoshi" 01P~~Yf11). 
The estimates show that the share of spending on public goods decreases along with the 
strengthening of county units' self revenue capacity significantly, which implies that for 
the counties with more expendable self revenue, public goods are not preferable targets to 
invest more compared with other functions . 
The structure of the residents' influences government spending behavior significantly: 1 
unit more of urban population percentage will increase the input on public goods by 
4.942 o/o in the budget. It is proved that the higher degree of urbanization is, the more 
likely that the county government will spend on the development of culture, education, 
health care and social security. The analysis exhibits that the historical factor of the share 
of spending on public goods is very significant for the explanation . The positive 
relationship between one year lagged share of expenditure on public goods and the 
dependent variable indicates that the arrangement of previous year has an important 
impact on that of current year, besides the general practice of county level governmental 
spending is fairly stable. 
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Table 4-6 Impact of Fiscal Transfer on the Share of Economic Construction Expenditure 
Share of expenditure on Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
economic construction (0/o) 
Predictor of Interest 
Share of special subsidies (In) 
Special subsidies per capita (In) 
Share of transfer (In) 




Share of financial-capacity transfer 0.691 *** 
(In) (0.169) 
Financial capacity transfer per 
capita (In) 
Local government self revenue 2.243 *** 
per capita (In) (0.313) 
Ratio of urban population (In) 
Population (In) 












































































In table 4-6 the impact on economic construction expenditure is estimated. The presumed 
positive relation between special transfer and the share of economic construction 
expenditure is confirmed, that 1 unit increase of the logged share of special transfer in 
recipient ' s revenue will raise the proportion of economic construction expenditure by 
4.157 o/o at the significant level of 0.0 1. A large proportion of special grants are designed 
to support the development of rural area and agriculture production, thus it is expected 
that special transfer will increase the expenditure on economic construction, which is 
mainly composed by agricultural supporting expenses at county level. 
The total transfer is also presenting the relation of same direction with the economic 
construction spending. For it is composed by the special subsidies and financial-capacity 
subsidies, it implies that large extent of positive impact of special subsidies contributes as 
the main factor to the positive relationship between fiscal transfer and expenditure on 
economic construction. Comparably the influences from fiscal-capacity transfer, self 
revenue on the expenditure, the urbanization degree and the population scale are weak 
and vague on the construction spending. The ratio of urban population are negative 
correlated with the share of economic construction expenses in most models, which 
reveals that the county governments in rural areas have more incentive to invest on 
economic construction than the urbanized regions. Among the control variables, the 
lagged share of expenditure on economic construction plays a crucial positive impact as 
the most significant explanatory variables. 
The contrast of special grants' impacts on different functions is also detected in the field 
study of the district A and county B. Referring to the national distribution of special 
subsidies, it presents that the public services are the main targets and should be more 
important than agriculture-supporting (Figure 3-5). As for the condition of Shanxi, 
because of the lack of fiscal data, the overall distribution of special subsidies among the 
departments of public goods provision as well as agriculture-supporting is unclear. While, 
in the field trip to county B in Shanxi, the author collected full particulars of the special 
subsides ' usage in the years of 2006 and 2007. The analysis of this individual case 
exhibits: in 2006 among all the 170 special subsidy programs, 61 programs are allocated 
to the departments of education, health care, social security and culture with the amount 
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of 39.57 million Yuan; while there was 53 construction projects either in urban or rural 
areas, with the amount of 19.85 million Yuan. In 2007 the ratio of construction expenses 
and public services in the projects of special subsidies were 21% and 67.8% respectively. 
Compared with what the regression results tell, the distribution of fiscal transfer among 
different function is more favorable to the provision of public goods and services, which 
is closer to the description of national orientation of special transfer program. However, 
the local official whom I interviewed also commented that comparably they have more 
incentive to apply and spend the ad hoc subsidies related to construction projects instead 
of those required to be redistributed to the residents through the education, health care 
and social security departments. In addition, the official of the agriculture bureau of 
district A commented that the construction projects attached with subsidies are attractive 
to local officials either of the district level or the townships under the jurisdiction of 
district A. He also emphasizes that such condition is more obvious in the rural areas. 
As for the budget process, the interviews reveal a crucial phenomenon that a considerable 
portion of fiscal transfer, especially the special transfers, is reallocated to county level at 
the end of the year. In the extreme cases almost half amount of the grants could not reach 
county recipients until the last month of the year. The official of the audit bureau explains 
that it is due to the upper levels, including the corresponding ministries in charge of the 
special grant programs, are inclined to hold the large amount of funds as long as possible 
to acquire bank interest. In that case, county government has to either fall behind with the 
payment of the programs, which is known as the "veiled debts" ("yinxing zhaiwu" ~~ti 
f:~~) or temporally remove fiscal resources from other channels, such as the budgetary 
fund ("yusuan guanlijijin" f~¥l~ll¥~) or extra-budget revenues for the special 
projects ought to be paid before the subsidies reach the county level. County government 
has more flexibility when the grants are used for constructions projects, such as road and 
bridge construction, than the sustainable expense for either governmental administration 
or public goods provision. This also helps for understanding why counties tend to spend 
more on economic construction. 
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Table 4-7 Impact of Fiscal Transfer on the Share of 
Government Administration Expenditure 
Share of Expenditure on Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Government Administration (0/o) 
Predictor of Interest 
Share of financial-capacity 
-0.431 *** 
transfer (In) (0.144) 
Financial capacity transfer 0.368 *** 
per capita (In) (0.131) 
Share of transfer (In) 
-1.350 *** 
(0.223) 




Share of special subsidies (In) -3.378 *** 
(0.357) 
Special subsidies per capita (In) -3.798 *** 
(0.267) 
Local government self revenue -1.716 *** 0.436 * -1.162 *** -0.225 
per capita (In) (0.269) (0.258) (0.250) (0.261) 
Ratio of urban population (In) -1.193 ** -0.365 -0.270 0.407 
(0.473) (0.440) (0.424) (0.423) 
Population(ln) -7.134 *** -4.192 ** -8.692 *** -6.916 *** 
(2.144) (1.996) (1.781) (1.751) 
Lagged share of expenditure on 0.557 *** 0.397 *** 0.592 *** 0.527 *** 
government administration (%) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) 
Constant 72.081 *** 51.743 *** 68.417 *** 55.855 *** 
(11.662) (1 0.825) (9.640) (9.537) 
R-Square 0.5767 0.7073 0.4492 0.5544 
Number of observations 944 944 1241 1241 
Groups 114 114 114 114 
County fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Significant codes: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<O.Ol. 
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In the test of the transfer's effect on government administration expense, the estimates 
reflect that, financial-capacity transfer, which is predicted as a positive factor for the 
increase of administrative expenses empirically increases the absolute input on 
governmental administration yet the increase of its proportion in the revenue of local 
government will deduct the share of expenditure on governmental administration. The 
proportion of governmental administration expense is slightly negative correlated with 
the share of fiscal transfer in revenue at a significant level of 0.0 1. 
County government officials divide the received fiscal transfer into "flexible-grants" 
("tanxing bokuan" Wtt~*J\) and "controlled-grants" ("guifan bokuan" ~5\lffi~*J\), 
according to the saying of the deputy director general of the finance bureau of District A. 
The former category, which is also, as we know, the financial-capacity subsidies, is 
rearranged to meet the resource requirement of different functions at the county level 
based on concrete conditions. The interesting finding is that although generally county 
governments have high level of autonomy and flexibility in dealing with the financial-
capacity grants and its self revenue, the ratio of input on the organization itself will not 
increase along with the raise of the flexible resources. One reason, as explained in the 
section of financial-capacity transfer's positive effect on the share of expenses on public 
services, is that large share of financial capacity subsidies mainly subsidizes wage 
increases and is reallocated according to the number of employee instead of different 
function. In that case, the large number of fiscal dependents in the public institutions, 
such as schools, research institutions and health care stations, absorb tremendous 
financial-capacity grants. Thus, the share of the expenses on these functions is 
comparably enlarged. Another possible explanation is from the interviews during my 
fieldtrip that the leakage of fiscal transfer resources into local bureaucrats' income is not 
reflected in the budget. The officials are inclined to take advantage from the construction 
project subsidies, which are not listed in the category of governmental administration 
expense. As the official from the audit bureau of County B describes, in the poor rural 
regions, the main sources of extra income of the officials is the grants attached on 
specific-projects, such as road and bridge construction, water resource facility and the 
grants on the subsidies on farmland and wood land. 
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These estimations illustrate the complex impact of fiscal transfer on county level 
government preference on the inputs among different functions. In summary, the two-
way fixed-effect regression of the panel data of Shanxi' s 114 county units from 1994 to 
2005 indicates that the impact of special subsidies on public goods provision is extremely 
contradicted with what is expected and predicted based on the design of special transfer. 
The only effective factor for the promotion of the public goods provision is coming from 
the block-grants for wage increases in the package of financial-capacity subsidies. 
Comparably, in the share of budgetary fiscal resources, economic construction is the most 
likely function to attract the ad hoc or discretionary resources, including both the self 
revenue of county government and the special subsidies. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
China's fiscal transfer system is introduced for the reallocation of governmental fiscal 
resources to balance the disparities vertically and horizontally, as well as to provide an 
appropriate finance system for the practice and implementation of government functions. 
The provision of an accessible system of decent public goods and services is a major 
function and responsibility of government. Transitioning China faces numerous serious 
problems, one of which is to alleviate the income distribution disparity in order to keep 
the society stable. 
The fiscal capacities of levels of governments are asymmetrical with the responsibilities 
assigned respectively. County level government takes the majority of the responsibility 
for the provision of public goods directly to the citizens; a large share of its expenses is 
allocated on public goods and services for the development of society, education and 
culture. 
This study takes the case of Shanxi Province to analyze the impact of fiscal transfer on 
the provision of public goods at county level, which evaluates the system of fiscal 
transfer from two aspects: 
1. The equalization effect of the reallocation of fiscal resources: 
Fiscal transfer system below-province basically plays a positive role in alleviating the 
disparities of counties ' expendable fiscal resources. As a reallocation arrangement it 
provides county government an equalized resource base for the implementation of 
different functions. The illustration of the composition of fiscal transfer (Figure 3-3) also 
indicates that the reallocation through fiscal transfer system is comparably 
institutionalized. 
2. The incentive scheme of fiscal transfer on public goods provision: 
Special subsidy is the driving force expected to encourage local recipient to spend on 
specific programs. The improvement of public services provision is the most important 
objective. However, through analyzing the relation between fiscal transfers received by 
county level governments and their preferences of expenditure, it is found that special 
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transfer has not been helping increase local government's investment on public services. 
It suggests the ineffective incentive mechanism attached with special subsidies. 
On the one hand, it results from the low degree of institutionalization of budget 
management in the implementation of fiscal transfer at county tier. Under China's 
condition, as a comparatively controllable instrument specific grants is extensively 
applied to improve the efficiency of the supply of public goods in the filed of education, 
heath care, social security and agriculture support. The assumption that special transfers 
with more constraints will encourage local recipient to input more on the specific projects 
according to the legal provisions of the grant programs is challenged by McGuire in a 
model where local officials are able to convert some fraction of conditional grants into 
fungible resources. He estimates that 70% of education aid is converted into fungible 
resources. In the following empirical studies, McGuire's "fungibility hypothesis" is 
applied to the data of large U.S. city governments on special grants projects of social and 
support services (Zampelli, 1986) and forty-nine upper-tier municipalities in Ontario 
from 1977 to 1984 (Islam, 1990), which suggests the existence of the substitution of grant 
funds for local recipients' own expenditures. Proofs show that a large number of special 
transfer payments have not been used for the designed projects. For instance, in the audit 
of 20 provincial governments' budget in 2005, it occurred that among all the 773.3 billion 
Yuan fiscal transfers, only 44% was listed in local budget and supervised by local 
congress and the central authority, leaving more than half unclear and without 
supervision. Wang Chong (2007) proceeded a test of the special education transfer 
payments from central to local government from 1998 to 2001 and empirically confirmed 
that a considerable leakage of transfer payments occurred in local's implementation. This 
cross-county analysis of Shanxi indicates that such a leakage of special transfer do exist 
in the implementation process because of the low level of institutionalization. 
On the other hand, under the condition of loose control, local officials prefer other 
functions to invest for various reasons, especially the economic construction. As the 
dual-characteristics of China's local officials summarized by Zhou (2004) describes: 
from one side, local officials are participants in market economy either as individual or 
representative of the public sector, like any other economic subjects pursuing the 
economic interests, which has been reflected in the 1980s' when governmental economic 
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incentive was enforced by the contracting fiscal system; from the other side, these 
officials are political participants concerning the political promotion and interests, 
competing not only over the fiscal revenue economically but also over political 
promotion. Under current circumstances, no matter from either facet of the characteristics, 
local officials are driven to devote their attention and resources to economic construction 
to attract more fiscal revenue, to get more extra income through rent-seeking and to be 
more qualified in the promotion assessment (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998; Zhang, Gao, Fu 
and Zhang, 2007). The interviews conducted in the two county units in Shanxi also 
confirm that the leakage of special transfer in the field of public goods provision can be 
explained that local officials are more willing to participate in construction projects. 
It turns out that the financial-capacity subsidy, with which local recipient enjoys large 
extent of autonomy on the usage, works as the key factor in the fiscal transfer package on 
increasing the expenditure ratio of public provision. The structure of financial-capacity 
transfer exhibits that wage subsidy accounts for a considerable portion, which is in large 
part is allocated to the employees of public institution at the department of education, 
health care and culture development. Thus, it contributes to the positive impact of 
financial-capacity grants on the expenditure of public goods provision, and this category 
of wage increase subsidy is the least likely to be displaced, because it is the baseline to 
prevent China's society from instability. Wong and Bird (2006) discover that the recent 
experience has taught local governments that Ministry of Finance will intervene 
whenever necessary to preserve social stability and will go to great lengths to prevent 
wage arrears from getting out of hand, which becomes a lure to local government to add 
staff. In the field trip in Shanxi, the similar situation exists either in the urban district and 
the rural county. As the head of Health Bureau says, there is little incentive for them to 
manage the non-personnel grants from the upper levels, while the truly capable officials 
are working on getting the position of public employee. The amounts of the non-
personnel and non-constructive subsidies are extremely small and strictly enforced 
according to national standards, such as the subsidy the minimum subsistence allowance 
for rural and urban residents ("chengxiang dibao" ~5-1~{~). 
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It implies that although the financial capacity subsidies positively affect the spending on 
public goods, the main incentive mechanism behind is to add staff. The enlargement of an 
inefficient system of county government will not only consistently consume fiscal 
resources in large scale, but on the other hand will also deduct governmental spending on 
the non-personnel expenses for the development of education, heath care, culture and 
social security, which will turn the public finance into a support system of bureaucrats 
and other public employees. 
In conclusion, fiscal transfer below province does alleviate the disparities of economic 
development and fiscal resources in the case of Shanxi. However, the political conditions 
determine that a favorable incentive mechanism through fiscal transfer for the 
improvement of the provision of public goods is far from established. 
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